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Shortly after the death of my grandfather, I was fondled for the first time by
a friend of the family. I had known Mr. Willie all of my life. He made it clear
that I better not tell anyone what he had done. If I did, he would tell my parents
that I was lying, and because of my lies, he would no longer take my father to
and from work. If my father lost his job, it would all be my fault. I believed him
and I never said a word. I remember feeling completely helpless in the
situation.
When I was 15 years old, I was on my way to my sister's house to babysit.
As I was turning the corner, a car pulled up with two men inside. One got out
and asked for directions. As I was giving him directions, he suddenly grabbed
my arm and pulled me into the car, forcing my face onto the floorboard. The
two drove to a construction site. They told me to get in the backseat and take
off my clothes. They wanted sex. As I crawled to the backseat of the car, I
noticed one door was unlocked. I quickly turned the doorknob and escaped. I
never told my parents. I was so scared and frightened I would not be believed.
At 18 1 was violently raped and badly beaten by Harold Yarbrough. He
threatened to kill me if1 told anyone or pressed charges against him. Because
we had mutual friends, I was always coming into contact with him. He
continued his threats. Harold terrified me-terrorized me for more than a year
after the rape. His control over me ended with his death in a car accident. I
was relieved. But, once again, I never told anyone of the rape.
The impact of my brutal rape and threats of retaliation shaped the way I
interact with men.
The showers at Western Wayne [correctional facility] are too small to
dress in without getting my clothes wet, so after my shower I dress near the
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sinks, in the bathroom near the sinks. There is no door from the hallway to the
bathroom so anyone walking down the hallway can see me in a state of
undress. When I dress in my room, I have a fear of men peeping over the door
cover. As I age in prison, one of the only things I have left is my body. Having
men look at me naked is such degradation.
Women prisoners are referred to as bitches and whores by officers. Male
staff at Western Wayne commonly refer to female prisoners as bitches and
"hos " and/or respond to women by saying fuck you.
Most complaints of sexual misconduct, inappropriate behavior, and
retaliation are not false. However, it is normal for only those involved in the
activity or cover-up to know the circumstances surrounding the crime. In cases
where there are no witnesses and it is a "he said, she said" situation, the
credibility of staff is always given more weight that that of the prisoner. If the
allegation is deemed false, the prisoner can expect to be further victimized and
punished by receiving an interference with administration major misconduct
ticket, which results in losing good time, disciplinary credits, and the possibility
of delaying parole.
Given the chilling consequences of reporting, many women are reluctant
or unwilling to report sexual misconduct, sexual harassment and/or privacy
violations.
Incarceration is a devastating experience, but if it is coupled with sexual
abuse and assault by correctional staff, it far exceeds the punishment imposed
by judges, lawmakers, and society.
Yes, I am a convicted felon, but my sentence does not require me to be
exposed to or at risk of sexual assault anywhere, especially by the individuals
hired to protect me.'
INTRODUCTION
From 1988 to 1998, I directed a legal and educational program for women
prisoners incarcerated at the Minimum Security Annex by the District of
Columbia Department of Corrections. In that role, I taught a curriculum that
included issues the women identified as priorities: housing, drug treatment,
child custody, employment, and health.2 I also did legal intake and helped
women inmates resolve problems they were having obtaining services from
their lawyers, the courts, social service agencies, and the prison. In 1992, the
composition of the cases I was receiving in the legal program changed.
Increasingly, I was providing legal assistance to address the problems women
1. Deposition of Gladys Wilson at 206, lines 1-25; 207, lines 1-8; 208, lines 14-22; 209, lines 9-12,
18-15; 210, lines 1-25; 211, lines 1-4, 8-11, Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 00-73133 (E.D. Mich
Feb. 23, 2001).
2. See BRENDA V. SMITH, A VISION BEYOND SURVIVAL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR INCARCERATED
WOMEN (National Women's Law Center 1995).
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faced because they had conceived while incarcerated.3 The many challenges
these women faced when they conceived in prison, 4 and my often unsuccessful
attempts to assist them in hiding, terminating, or managing their pregnancies,
forced me to examine how they had become pregnant in a system that
specifically prohibits any sexual activity by prisoners. While there are serious
consequences for sex with male inmates, including possible loss of good time
credits or denial of parole for becoming pregnant while incarcerated,6 female
inmates were much more concerned with identifying prison staff as the fathers
of their children because they feared retaliation and violence from other
inmates and staff. Not surprisingly, the action or inaction of the institution and
its staff bore the primary responsibility for inmate pregnancy.7 Female inmates
3. The District of Columbia Department of Corrections, like most jurisdictions, did not keep
reliable statistics on the number of women inmates who conceived while incarcerated. Also, women
often did not report their pregnancies for fear they would be punished by the prison or by the paroling
agency. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WOMEN IN PRISON: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY
CORRECTIONAL STAFF, A Report to the Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, House of Representatives,
GAO/GGD-99-104, 7-8 (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT].
4. Women prisoners who give birth experience problems arranging for custody of their children. In
the absence of an already identified custodian, most women leave their infants at public hospitals and
return to prison 24-48 hours after delivery. These infants may become "boarder babies" and eventually
wards of the state. Women who decide to terminate their pregnancies experience problems obtaining
abortions. In the District of Columbia and most other states, officials may not use federal funds to pay
for abortions for low-income women except in cases of rape or incest. The District of Columbia's
situation is even more restrictive because the District may use neither federal funds nor its own revenues
to fund abortions for low-income women. Consequently, in order to obtain abortions, District of
Columbia women prisoners must find private funding or use their own, often meager, resources to pay
for an abortion. They must also arrange with the Department of Corrections to be transported, in
shackles, to private facilities like Planned Parenthood to obtain abortions. Finally, women who carry
their pregnancies to term experience many problems obtaining appropriate prenatal care and nutrition.
They often experience high-risk pregnancies complicated by their poor health status, which includes risk
of violence, drug addiction, HIV infection and the presence of other sexually transmitted diseases, and
mental illness. See generally Ellen M. Barry, CRIM. J. Bad Medicine: Health Care Inadequacies in
Women's Prisons 39, 39-43 (2001) [hereinafter Barry, Bad Medicine]; Ellen M. Barry et al., Legal
Issuesfor Prisoners with Children, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS147, 155 (Katherine Gabel
& Denise Johnston eds., 1995).
5. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHT PROJECT, ALL TOO FAMILAR: SEXUAL
ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS 2 (1996) [hereinafter ALL Too FAMILIAR] ("One of the clear
contributing factors to sexual misconduct in U.S. prisons for women is that the United States, despite
authoritative rules to the contrary, allows male correctional employees to hold contact positions over
prisoners, that is, positions in which they serve in constant physical proximity to the prisoners of the
opposite sex"); Christine E. Rasche, Cross-Sex Supervision of Incarcerated Women and the Dynamics of
Staff Sexual Misconduct, in GENDERED JUSTICE: ADDRESSING THE FEMALE OFFENDER (Barbara Bloom
ed., 2003) ("The problems associated with cross-sex supervision of female inmates are numerous and
reflect not only the management challenges posed by incarcerated female offenders in particular, but
also the traditional difficulties of gender relations in our society in general").
6. See Mary Zahn, Inmate Punishedfor Sex with Guard; Case Exposes Gap in Law; Man Fired Not
Prosecuted, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 22, 2003, at Al (reporting that a mentally ill inmate who
was impregnated by prison guard received one year of solitary confinement while the prison guard was
only fired).
7. This article does not deny women's agency. Nor does it address the complicated personal and
strategic reasons why women may have sex in prison, like the need for intimacy, the desire to express
their sexuality, the desire to bear a child. See generally Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay
on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001) (cautioning that exclusively
conceptualizing women's sexuality as a site of danger obscures the complex and affirmative reasons
women may want to have sex); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
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conceived because inadequate staffing or lack of supervision enabled them to
8
find opportunities to have sexual relations with staff or other inmates; because
staff actively arranged for women to have sex with male inmates and other
staff;9 or because staff compelled sex from women inmates by use of force,
threats or inducements.10
After my attempts to resolve these systemic issues informally through
demands failed, Ill filed suit on behalf of a class of women prisoners1 2 alleging
violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 3 The litigation, Women
Prisoners v. District of Columbia,l4 established that a pattern of sexual abuse
and harassment of women inmates violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The litigation raised the issue of sexual misconduct in prisons as a
national concern | 5 and a subject for scholarly critique. 6 It was also the first
class action by women inmates challenging sexual abuse by correctional 
staff.1 7
WIS. L. REV. 187, 225 (1988) ("People have a strong affirmative interest in sexual expression and
relationships"). See, e.g., Susan Rosenberg, Lee's Time, in DOING TIME: 25 YEARS OF PRISON WRITING
206-07 (1999) (giving a fictional short account of one woman inmate's motivation for having sex with a
male guard). However, sexual contact between inmates and prison staff must be judged in light of the
special responsibility correctional institutions bear toward inmates. The Supreme Court has recognized
custodial settings as the foremost example of situations where a special relationship exists. See
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197-200 (1989) (noting that when
the state takes a person into custody and holds him or her there, the Constitution imposes upon the state
a "corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and well-being." This special
relationship in the prison setting rests on the total lack of control inmates have over the most basic
aspects of their lives and the complete control correctional institutions and staff have over inmates);
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing the
dependence of institutionalized persons). Courts have found that the corresponding Constitutional
obligation, coupled with statutes prohibiting sexual contact with prison staff, negates an inmate's ability
to voluntarily consent to sexual contact with prison staff members. See Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d
448, 459-461 (D. Del. 1999) (discussing inmates' inherent lack of meaningful capacity to consent to
sexual contact with correctional institution staff).
8. See Apendix A for Trial Transcript at 1-76 to 1-78, Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia,
877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (No. 93-2052(JLG)).
9. See, e-g., Lucas v. White, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (alleging male officer
repeatedly gave male inmates access to female inmates for sex); Downey v. Denton County 119 F.3d
381 (5th Cir. 1997) (complaining that female officer arranged for male officer to have sex with female
inmate); Ware v. Jackson, 150 F.3d 873 (8th Cir.1998) (complaining that male officer arranged for
himself and three other male inmates to have sex with female inmates).
10. Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 634.
11. The author was Senior Counsel for Economic Security and Director of the Women in Prison
Project at the National Women's Law Center at the time she filed suit against the D.C. Department of
Corrections with Peter Nickles, counsel from the law firm of Covington & Burling.
12. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Order Certifying Class, Women
Prisonersv. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (3-2052(JLG)).
13. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 1-46, 69-76, Women v. District of
Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (No. 93-2052(JLG)).
14. See generally Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994)
[hereinafter Women Prisoners I]; stay denied and motion to modify granted in part, Women Prisoners v.
District of Columbia, 899'F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995) [hereinafter Women Prisoners II]; Women
Prisoners v. District of Columbia, vacated in part, remanded, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter
Women Prisoners III]; Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 520 U.S. 1196 (1997) cert. denied
[hereinafter Women Prisoners IV].
15. See generally GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 3; WOMEN IN PRISON:
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES CONFRONTING U.S. CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS, A Report to the Honorable
Eleanor Holmes Norton, United States House of Representatives, GAO/GGD-00-22 (Dec. 1999).
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A natural outgrowth of the Women Prisoners litigation has been the search
for policy and practice recommendations to prevent sexual misconduct. One of
the most often called for remedies for sexual misconduct has been to end the
cross-gender supervision of female inmates.' 8 Cross-gender supervision is the
supervision of inmates by staff of the opposite gender19 and encompasses a
range of practices including escorting prisoners, searching prisoners, and
observing prisoners while they work, sleep, eat or perform intensely private
functions, such as bathing and toileting.20 The theory contends that if female
staff supervised women inmates, then a primary vector for sexual misconduct
would be eradicated. This rationale, of course, is subject to four significant
criticisms. First, eliminating cross-gender supervision still ignores the sexual
misconduct female inmates experience at the hands of female staff.21 Second,
16. See generally Martin R. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating
International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law- A Case Study of Women in
United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 73 (2000) (noting increased international and domestic
scrutiny of the human rights crisis in U.S. prisons and the need for U.S. courts to incorporate
international human rights laws through domestic civil rights laws); Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her
Womanhood: Defining the Privacy Rights of Women Prisoners and the Employment Rights of Women
Guards, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1 (1998-1999) (arguing that greater employment rights
for women were achieved at the expense of the privacy rights of male prisoners by adopting gender
stereotypes for both genders within the correctional system); Delisa Springfield, Sisters in Misery:
Utilizing International Law to Protect United States Female Prisoners from Sexual Abuse, 10 IND. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 457 (2000) (discussing the need for the U.S. to fully ratify the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and recognize that the abuse, rape and torture of female prisoners are
serious human rights violations); Cheryl Bell et al., Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison System:
Analyzing America's Most "Open" Secret, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 195 (1999) (criticizing the
inflexibility of the courts' adherence to deliberate indifference and qualified immunity standards for
prison officials as found in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
17. But see Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1312 & n.14 (10th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing
Women Prisoners I on grounds of pervasiveness: "Women Prisoners involved repeated reports and
incidents of prison guards sexually assaulting and harassing women inmates. Despite prison officials'
knowledge of this longstanding abuse, the officials ignored the reports and took no reasonable measures
to alleviate these conditions").
18. See generally ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 5; Radhika Coomaraswamy Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, E.S.C. Res. 1997/44, U.N.
ESCOR, 55th Sess., at # 55-56, U.N. Doc. E/CN/.4/1999/68/Add.2 (1999) [hereinafter Report of the
Special Rapporteur]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ABUSES IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA 197 (1996);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BREAKING THE CHAIN: THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN PRISONERS 5
(2000).
19. This, of course, assumes that gender is the appropriate comparison. See Teresa A. Miller, Sex
and Surveillance: Gender, Privacy and the Sexualization of Power in Prison, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L. J. 291, 299 (2000) [hereinafter Miller, Sex and Surveillance] ("Prisons are sites of sexual and
gender complexity that require a far more nuanced understanding of the relationship between gender,
nudity, sex and violence than that implicit in the doctrinal analysis of cross-gender search cases").
20. These searches range from "pat searches," where staff run their hands over clothed inmates, to
"strip searches," where inmates are asked to remove clothing, to "cavity searches," where staff or
medical personnel use their hands to search the orifices (mouth, anus, vagina, ears, nose) of an inmate.
21. Compare Miller, Sex and Surveillance supra note 19, at n.33 ("Prisoner family groupings
appear to be the source of power through which women who distrust each other guard against being
cheated or hurt by other women. These attachments are often reinforced through sexual intimacy rather
than through sexual violence") with Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C., 1999)
(involving female inmate striptease at jail organized by female staff) and Daskalea v. District of
Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.D.C., 2000) (involving female inmate striptease at jail organized by female
staff).
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same-sex supervision of women inmates by female staff ignores sexual
misconduct by male and female staff against male inmates.22 Third, the call to
end cross-gender supervision may run counter to significant Title VII
jurisprudence ensuring equal opportunity to men and women in employment.
23
Finally, this proposal turns a blind eye to the egregious instances of sexual
misconduct that took place in settings where same-sex supervision policies
24were already in place.
This article addresses these arguments and ultimately concludes that same-
sex supervision should be adopted in U.S. prisons in supervising both male and
female prisoners. First, while same-sex supervision may not prevent sexual
misconduct, it may reduce it by cutting off a primary vector of sexual
misconduct-cross-gender interactions between staff and inmates. Second,
same-sex supervision may increase prisoner well-being by giving prisoners a
greater sense of control over their bodies, thereby reducing their sense of
vulnerability to abuse.25 Finally, adopting same-sex supervision policies would
make the United States' position more congruent with international standards
for the treatment of prisoners. 26 Currently, the United States is the one of the
few developed countries that permits cross-gender supervision of male or
female inmates in sensitive areas such as living areas, showers and
bathrooms.27
22. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRisoNs (2001).
Several states report that the majority of their staff sexual misconduct complaints involve male inmates
and female staff. Several factors may account for this. First, the fact that the vast majority of prisoners
are male naturally leads to more complaints made by men. Second, female staff have relatively low
status in correctional settings, and are therefore less likely to receive protection in correctional
environments. Third, female staff may experience such harassment and lack of support from their male
counterparts that they form alliances with male inmates for protection and support.
23. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964). For a more in-
depth discussion of Title VII employment issues attendant to cross-gender supervision, see infra Part IV.
24. Women staff may even have acceded to the conduct in order to gain favor or identify with more
powerful male staff; women staff, themselves subject to the same conduct, may have had little power to
remedy the situation for women inmates. See Women Prisoners I, supra note 14, at 639 (finding the
existence of a "sexualized environment" where "boundaries and expectations of behavior are not clear");
Neal v. District of Columbia, No. 93-2420, 1995 WL 517248 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1995) (finding that the
Department of Corrections engaged in a pattern and practice of sexual harassment by creating a sexually
hostile working environment for female staff).
25. See Angela Browne et al., Prevalence and Severity of Lifetime Physical and Sexual
Victimization Among Incarcerated Women, 22 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 301, 319 (1999) ("Time spent
in an incarcerated setting provides an opportunity for targeted interventions that could markedly
improve the potential for adjustment within the incarcerated setting and successful reintegration when
women return to the community"). This may be particularly true for women prisoners whose significant
histories of physical and sexual abuse may leave them more vulnerable to sexual abuse in institutional
settings.
26. U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, Rule 53(B)(2), U.N.
Doc/A/CONF/6/I annex I A (1956), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 35,
U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977). International standards call for, among other things, close supervision of
female inmates by female staff.
27. See, e.g., Raghubans v. State, 1972 A.I.R. (P&H) 17 (1971) (concluding that women, given
their "peculiarities," were not fit to supervise male prisoners, and citing an American case, Meuller v.
Oregon State Corr. Inst., 690 P.2d 532 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), to bolster the proposition that women are
the "weaker sex"). In the spirit of parity, however, the Tihar Prisons of India also require that no men
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Part II of this article describes the context of sexual misconduct against
prisoners in the United States, highlighting important cases and discourse. It
also reviews and critiques the response of states and the federal government to
sexual misconduct in prison. Part III examines important differences in the
legal decisions that address claims challenging cross-gender supervision raised
by or concerning male and female inmates. Part IV addresses the disconnect
between the jurisprudence involving cross-gender supervision of men and
women, and examines the explicit and implicit assumptions about race and
gender that account for the difference in treatment.
Part V concludes with a recommendation that the U.S. establish a zone of
privacy for both male and female inmates that exists regardless of the inmate's
gender. It further concludes that while same-sex supervision of male and
female inmates is an imperfect solution, it remains the best response presently
available. The article also provides recommendations for implementing same-
sex supervision consistent with Title VII, thereby recognizing both the
importance of equal employment opportunities and the right to privacy and
basic human dignity of both male and female inmates.
I. THE CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM
Over the past ten years, staff sexual misconduct has become a major prison
management and policy issue for states and the federal government. While the
problem first presented itself in major litigation against state corrections
agencies, it soon became a major source of critique for the U.S. by both
domestic and international organizations. Several early cases, Cason v.
Seckinger,28 Women Prisoners v. D. C.,29 and two cases brought by the Special
Litigation Section of the U.S. Department of Justice under the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act 30 illustrate the different approaches that the
government and advocates have utilized to address sexual abuse of women in
custody.
A. Early Litigation
Sexual misconduct often arises as part of other unconstitutional abuses and
conditions in a corrections system. Often, the issue of sexual misconduct may
not be an initial complaint, but instead may arise in the course of investigating
supervise the women prisoners. See Tihar Prisons, available at
http://www.tiharprisons.nic.in/vstiharprisons/html/infra.htm (noting that the women have their own
ward, which is supervised solely by women).
27. 231 F.3d. 777 (11th Cir. 2000).
28. 877 F.Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994).
30. PUB. L. No. 96-247, § 2, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997) (authorizing the
Special Litigation Division of United States Department of Justice to investigate and litigate allegations
of abuse against individuals held in institutions, including correctional facilities).
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other claims. Cason v. Seckinger, one of the first contemporary cases to address
widespread sexual misconduct against women, exemplifies this pattern.
31
Cason was originally filed in 1984 and sought to remedy numerous alleged
constitutional violations related to conditions of confinement. 32 In 1990,
however, allegations of widespread sexual abuse of women in Georgia's
Milledgeville State Prison emerged in enforcement proceedings related to the
existing litigation.33 Allegations included claims that women were forced to
have sex with staff, routinely exchanged sex for favors, and experienced verbal
harassment.34 Women also alleged that their complaints about the abuse went
unheeded and uninvestigated; 35 that they suffered emotional and psychological
harm as a result of the abuse and did not receive appropriate counseling to deal
with the trauma;36 and that they were placed in physical restraints and seclusion
for days at a time.37 They claimed that during seclusion, male officers often
38stripped them naked and observed them on camera. On March 7, 1984, the
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, entering an order permanently enjoining
sexual contact, sexual harassment, and staff sexual abuse of female inmates.39
In 1993, I litigated Women Prisoners L.40 As in Cason, allegations of
widespread sexual abuse of women emerged during the fact investigation for
the underlying claims.4 ' In Women Prisoners I, women incarcerated in the
District of Columbia correctional system alleged that they were denied equal
access to educational, vocational, work, apprenticeship, and religious
opportunity.42 In the course of conducting fact investigations on claims of
unequal access to education, recreation, and work and industry assignment,
female inmates revealed widespread sexual relations between male staff and
female inmates and between male inmates and female inmates, at each of the
31. 231 F.3d 777 (1 th Cir. 2000).
32. See id. at 779.
33. See id. at 779 n.4 (detailing several consent decrees entered between 1992 and 1994 pertaining
to the sexual abuse of inmates, as well as the final order for permanent injunctive relief in reference to
all forms of sexual misconduct, entered on March 7, 1994).
34. Id. at n.2; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 18, 60-63 (discussing the
factual allegations made in Cason, including that women were forced to have involuntary abortions as a
result of sexual abuse suffered during incarceration).
35. See id., 231 F.3d at 779, n.2.
36. Id. at n. 2, 23-24.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Id. at n.4. This was the court's final order. From 1992 until 1995, the court also entered a series
of consent decrees. Id. The decrees provided, inter alia, confidential reporting guidelines for women
inmates who were victims of sexual abuse, counseling for these inmates, procedures for investigating
staff sexual misconduct, and a prohibition on inmate strip searches, except in very limited
circumstances. Id.
40. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994).
41. Pursuant to the discovery of these facts, the women alleged that they were subjected to a
widespread pattern of sexual abuse and harassment in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments,
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Women
Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995).
42. Id.
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three facilities that were the subject of the litigation.43 What surfaced was
evidence of abuse including: inappropriate comments of a sexual nature;
touching of women's breasts, buttocks and vaginal area; sex in exchange for
food, cigarettes, and privileges; and sexual assault.44 While Cason involved the
complaints of individual women, the allegations of sexual abuse, denial of
equal access to programming, poor medical care, and unsafe living conditions
were so pervasive and consistent that the plaintiff-female inmates were certified
as a class. 45 The female prisoners sought to hold the defendants liable pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 198346 and D.C. Code §§ 22-425 and 22-442.47
In December 1994, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia found that within the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections, there existed a "'sexualized environment' where 'boundaries and
expectations of behavior are not clear,' 48 and that such an environment was
sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute an Eighth Amendment
violation.49 Specifically, the court found that "[t]he physical assaults endured
by women prisoners at the Annex, CTF and the Jail unquestionably violate the
Eighth Amendment .... In combination, vulgar sexual remarks of prison
officers, the lack of privacy within CTF cells and the refusal of some male
corrections officers to announce their presence in the living areas of women
prisoners constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment."5 ° The district court
found that "many incidents of sexual misconduct between prison employees
and female prisoners in all three of the women's facilities in this case" had
occurred.5' The court concluded that while the D.C. Department of Corrections
had anti-sexual misconduct policies in place, those policies were of little value
because of the lack of staff training, inconsistent reporting practices, inadequate
investigation, and timid sanctions.
52
43. The three facilities that were the subject of the litigation were the District of Columbia Central
Detention Facility (Jail), the Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF) and the Lorton Minimum Security
Annex (Annex). Both male and female inmates were housed at each of the three facilities.
44. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 639-40.
45. See id. at 638-39. The class was defined as "all women prisoners who are incarcerated in the
District of Columbia correctional system as of October 1, 1993, and all women prisoners who will be
hereafter incarcerated in the D. C. correctional system."
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The statute provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress."
47. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-425 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-442 (1989) (providing, in pertinent
part, that "[the] Department of Corrections... shall.., be responsible for the safekeeping, care,
protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons committed to [facilities under its jurisdiction])."
48. Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 639.
49. See id. at 665; see also Neal v. District of Columbia, No. 93-2420, 1995 WL 517244 (D.D.C.
1995) (alleging similar pattern and practice of sexual harassment of female staff).
50. Women Prisoners 1, 877 F.Supp. at 655 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at639.
52. See id. at 640.
2003]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Subsequent litigation by the U.S. Department of Justice Special Litigation
Section sought to remedy sexual misconduct by holding states accountable for
violations of CRIPA, a statute only enforceable by the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ). In 1997, the Special Litigation Section of the DOJ filed suit
against Arizona and Michigan for widespread patterns of sexual abuse of
women inmates under CRIPA,53 and eventually obtained settlements in each
case in 1999.54 The Department of Justice entered both cases in response to
allegations of state failure to protect inmates from staff sexual misconduct. As a
result, Michigan's settlement agreement required, among other things, the
institution of a six-month moratorium on cross-gender pat searches of female
inmates. The settlement agreement also prohibited male staff from being alone
with female inmates and required male staff to announce their presence
anywhere female inmates might be in a state of undress.55 Arizona's settlement
agreement required better applicant screening, the use of contract employees,
improved training and investigations, meaningful sanctions, and prohibitions
against rehiring any employee who resigns in lieu of dismissal after an
allegation of sexual misconduct.56
Cason, Women Prisoners and the Department of Justice's CRIPA litigation
represent a timeline of the efforts to address sexual abuse of women in custody.
The sexual abuse claims in Cason arose from individual women's allegations
of sexual abuse in the context of a larger piece of litigation, even though the
ultimate remedy affected all female prisoners in the Georgia Department of
Corrections. Women Prisoners addressed the pervasive and institutionalized
character of sexual abuse of women in custody by recognizing that women
could experience sexual abuse in custody as a class of women and that sexual
abuse could be "cruel and unusual punishment' 57 as envisioned in the U.S.
53. PUB. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980).
54. United States v. Michigan, No. 97-CVB-71514-BDT (E.D. Mich. 1999); United States v.
Arizona, No. 97-476-PHX-ROS (D.Ariz. 1999). But see Letter from Regan Ralph, Executive Director of
the Women's Rights Division of Human Rights Watch, to Janet Reno, United States Attorney General
(June 11, 1999), at http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/jun/reno611 .htm ("condemning" settlement of the
Michigan case by the Department of Justice as "grossly inadequate" and "leav[ing] the women
vulnerable to sexual harassment and abuse by corrections staff').
55. See United States v. Michigan, No. 97-CVB-71514-BDT (E.D. Mich. 1999). When the
Michigan Department of Corrections responded to the underlying problem by taking steps to make
female gender a bona fide occupational qualification for the positions of Correctional Officer and
Resident Unit Officer in female housing units, male and female corrections officers challenged the move
on grounds that gender-specific assignments violate § 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
see also Everson v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding
gender-based assignments in Corrections Officer and Resident Unity Office positions constitute gender-
based discrimination).
56. See United States v. Arizona, No. 97-476-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. 1999)
57. A series of cases address whether all sex, even where prisoners "consent" to the sexual contact
is actionable under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. The courts have been split on this issue,
with several of them taking the position that the authority of correctional officers renders any form of
inmate consent ineffective. See, e.g., D.R., 972 F.2d at (recognizing dependence of institutionalized
persons). Furthermore, courts have found that the corresponding Constitutional obligation, coupled with
statutes prohibiting sexual contact with prison staff, precludes an inmate's ability to voluntarily consent
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Constitution. Moreover, the Department of Justice litigation situated protection
from sexual abuse of women in custody as a civil right, which the government
was obligated to protect. Subsequent litigation58 has proceeded under one of the
three models discussed above, often addressing questions left unanswered by
this first generation of litigation.59
While subsequent litigation has received widespread media attention, it is
fair to say that claims of sexual abuse of women in custody have garnered only
mixed results in the courts. On the one hand, the litigation has established that
sexual abuse of women in custody is a violation of the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution.61 At the same time, however, the doctrine of qualified
immunity, 62 which shields government officials from civil liability in
performing discretionary functions as long as their conduct does not violate
clearly established constitutional rights, of which a reasonable person should
have known, has often meant that prisons, prison officials, and municipalities
63
are held blameless, while individual corrections officers are held liable. While
to the sexual contact with prison staff members. See, e.g., Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997)
(noting that if a state legislature's treatment of the injury is de minimis - in that sanctions for crimes are
relatively lax - it will result in de minimis review at trial when a violation of the law is alleged); Fisher
v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (ruling that consensual sex engaged in before the
enactment of New York's law characterizing such activity as statutory rape was legal, while
acknowledging that the concept of "consensual" sex in prisons was a sham, due to the particular
situation of prisons); see also Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459-461 (D. Del. 1999). Other
courts have found that the inmate's willingness to engage in sexual activity obviates any claim for
damages for sexual abuse.
58. See Lucas v. White, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1999). In Lucas, three female inmates
housed at the federal prison in Dublin, California, sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons seeking monetary
damages, changes in prison procedures, and staff training. Robin Lucas, Valerie Mercadel, and Raquel
Douthit alleged that they were placed in a men's security unit and sold as sex slaves by male staff to
male inmates. The women prevailed and were jointly awarded $500,000 in damages. Significantly, as
part of the settlement, the Federal Bureau of Prisons undertook a national training program on staff
sexual misconduct with inmates and developed a confidential reporting system to protect women from
retaliation. See also Amador v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Serv., (S.D.N.Y. 03 Civ. 0650 filed on
Feb. 2003) (suit filed on behalf of individual cureent and released women inmates for injunctive and
declaratory relief and monetary damages for sexual abuse in New York state prisons); Neal v. Dep't of
Corr., 592 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. 1998) (seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and monetary damages
for sexual harassment and retaliation on behalf of female correctional staff).
59. See generally Kristine Mullendore & Laurie Beever, Sexually Abused Female Inmates in State
and Local Correctional Facilities. I WOMEN, GIRLS & CRIM. JUST. 81-96 (Oct./Nov. 2000) (providing
thorough case summaries of litigation involving sexual abuse of women prisoners, and providing
background information on seminal cases, such as Women Prisoners).
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir.
1997); Hovater v. Robinson, I F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 1993); Newby v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433
(D.D.C. 1999).
62. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). But see Farmer, 511 U.S. 825 (articulating a
new standard of "deliberate indifference," which is a lower standard than a knowing violation of an
inmate's rights).
63. See. e.g., Carrigan v. Delaware, 957 F. Supp. at 1376 (finding individual correctional officer
liable, while the state correctional officials and state department of corrections were dismissed from suit
under the doctrine of qualified immunity); see also Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997); Fisher
v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
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finding individual actors liable 64 provides some measure of vindication for the
victims, it does little to address the complicity of systems and officials in the
sexual abuse of women in custody.
65
While these setbacks are disheartening, early litigation like Cason and
Women Prisoners nevertheless played an important part in establishing that
staff sexual misconduct occurred within inmates' institutional settings.66 In
particular, Women Prisoners established that unremediated sexual misconduct
violated the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. As a result of
Women Prisoners and cases like it, the public was much more willing to
believe that such abuses could occur, particularly when confronted with
67instances of abuse of power in other institutions including foster care, the
68 69 70 71juvenile system, the church, the military, and government. Moreover, the
emergence of dialogue on the pervasive climate of violence and harassment
that exists against women not only in this country but also in other countries
has increased the public's willingness to hear and credit that such abuses could
occur. 72 Specifically, the public discourse on partner violence, rape, and sexual
64. Findings of liability are helpful, but little happens to the offending officers themselves; they are
often allowed to resign only to be re-employed in other systems. They also usually face only
misdemeanor penalties or probation. See Former INS Guard Gets Probation for Sex Act, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 21, 2001, at lB (reporting on a former immigration guard who engaged in a sexual act
with a female detainee sex offender; noting that he was sentenced to three years of probation and
ordered to resign immediately from his job at a detention facility for juvenile sex offenders); How
Felony Rape Became a Misdemeanor, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 2, 2001 (criticizing the Department of
Justice's "deal" with guards to accept misdemeanor consensual sex charges); John Gunning, Jailer
Pleads Guilty to Having Female Inmate Do Striptease, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2000 (reporting on the
fourth correctional officer in a year to be convicted of sexual misconduct; convicted of a class A
misdemeanor and sentenced to one year of misdemeanor probation and the permanent revocation of his
peace officer and jailer license). See generally BRENDA V. SMITH AND LOREN C. PONDS, FIFTY STATE
SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL LAWS PROHIBITING THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF INDIVIDUALS IN CUSTODY
(2004) [hereinafter 50 STATE SURVEY 2004] (detailing state and federal penalties for violations of sexual
misconduct laws).
65. But see generally, Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592, 594-95 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding personally
liable officials of Iowa Corrections Institute for Women, who repeatedly gave offending corrections
officer access to inmates, after several complaints had been made and disciplinary action taken); GAO
REPORT ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 3; Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 18.
66. See, e.g., Toni Locy, Study: Sex Abuse Rife in Women's Prisons, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2001, at
A13 (citing an Amnesty International study finding widespread misconduct and lack of legal sanction of
sexual abuse in U.S. prisons).
67. See, e.g., Kendra Hurley, Heed Lessons of Church Scandal, USA TODAY, Jul. 25, 2002, at A13
(seizing opportunity to discuss pervasiveness of sexual abuse against children in foster care system amid
highly publicized Catholic Church sexual abuse controversy).
68. See, e.g., Rick Brundrett, 11 Youths Sue South Carolina Juvenile Prison System, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Jun. 19, 2002, at 1 (reporting on a $27 million suit alleging that prison officials failed
to protect juvenile detainees from sexual and physical abuse by other youths or staffmembers).
69. See, e.g., William Lobdell, Turmoil in the Church, Dioceses' Policies Reflect Settlement, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at BI (discussing overhaul of church's policies in light of recent settlement with
sexual abuse victim).
70. See, e.g., Army Calls Sex Bias Widespread, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 12, 1997, at IA
("sexual harassment exists throughout the Army crossing gender, rank, and racial lines").
71. See. e.g., Jackie Calmes, White House Tries to Stick to Business Amid Scandal, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 30, 1998, at A20 (discussing sexual harassment lawsuit brought against former President Clinton).
72. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001 (Feb. 2002).
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harassment has educated and informed the public and policymakers about
sexual abuse against women prisoners. Consequently, enacting legislation to
protect prisoners from sexual abuse became politically feasible.
B. The Enactment ofLegislation Prohibiting Sexual Abuse of Prisoners
In response to the increased attention on staff sexual misconduct with
inmates, states enacted laws specifically prohibiting sexual contact between
correctional staff and inmates.73 In the early 1990s, few states had laws
specifically prohibiting sexual contact between correctional staff and inmates.74
In the absence of such statutes, many incidents of sexual misconduct could not
be prosecuted under existing general sexual assault statutes where consent is a
defense to the conduct. Often, staff involved claimed that the inmate had either
enticed them75 or had consented to the conduct. 76 As a result, states enacted
laws, often in the wake of visible incidents, prohibiting any sexual contact
between prisoners and staff. 77 These laws differ in their coverage - some
apply only to prisons,78 while others cover prisons, parole, probation, and work
release programs.79 Still others cover juvenile facilities.80 Some states take the
approach of broadly covering anyone under "custody" or authority of law.
81
Three states, Arizona, Nevada, and Delaware, have passed legislation
providing for the prosecution of inmates who willingly engage in sexual
misconduct with staff.82 These states have also codified inmate consent into
73. See generally 50 STATE SURVEY 2004, supra note 64.
74. At present, only three states (Alabama, Oregon, and Vermont) have not enacted legislation
specifically prohibiting sexual contact between staff and inmates. See 50 STATE SURVEY 2004, supra
note 64, at 1, 29, 33. Legislation in Wisconsin was enacted in August 2003 after a highly publicized
incident in which a male correctional officer impregnated a mentally ill inmate. Id. at 35. See Zahn,
supra note 6, at Al (detailing Republican legislator's intent to "introduce legislation to make sexual
contact between prison employees and inmates a felony").
75. See, e.g., Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (D. Del. 1999) (alleging plaintiff enticed
defendant by opening her bathrobe, baring her breasts, and inviting defendant into her room to look at
some pictures).
76. See, e.g., Long v. McGinnis, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2556 (alleging plaintiff's consent to sex
with male corrections officer).
77. See 50 STATE SURVEY 2004, supra note 64, at 4-6 (noting that COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-404
(West 2000) provides that any actor subjecting any person in custody to any sexual contact is guilty of
unlawful sexual conduct).
78. See id. Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Mississippi have enacted legislation prohibiting
sexual contact with inmates only in prison settings.
79. See id. Georgia, Kansas, and Illinois are among states that have enacted legislation covering
prisons, parole, probation, and work release programs.
80. See id. Iowa, Kansas, Arizona, Maryland, Montana, and California are among states that have
enacted legislation expressly prohibiting sexual contact with persons in juvenile facilities.
81. See id. The District of Columbia, Florida, and Connecticut are among states that have enacted
legislation covering anyone in custody or under authority of law.
82. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-419(B) (1989 and Supp. 1999) ("A prisoner who is in the custody of
the state department of corrections or an offender who is on release status and who is under the
supervision of the state department of corrections commits unlawful sexual conduct by engaging in oral
sexual contact, sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who is employed by the state
department of corrections or a private prison facility or who contracts to provide services with the state
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their statutes. This approach is in the minority - twenty-one states specifically
provide that the consent of the inmate is not a defense available to staff accused
of prohibited conduct. 83 The large majority of states define these offenses as
felonies.84
Even though the enactment of legislation has been a critical element in
responding to staff sexual misconduct with inmates, it has not had the broad
prophylactic effect that policymakers, advocates, and corrections officials
anticipated. Unfortunately, sexual abuse in institutional settings remains even
less likely to be reported and prosecuted than sexual assault in the larger
85community. All of the barriers to the prosecution of sexual assault in general,
such as issues related to credibility, the shifting nature of consent, and problems
of proof, are intensified when the complainant is a prisoner.
86
C. Domestic Scrutiny of Staff Sexual Misconduct with Inmates
In 1996, the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) began a process of
examining the scope of the problem of sexual misconduct and the responses of
correctional agencies to those problems. NIC published a study in November
199687 that made several important findings. First, the report found "significant
department of corrections or a private prison facility"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 212-187 (NRS 1999)
(effective until July 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1259, 4205 (Michie 1995 and Supp. 2000).
83. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126 (Michie 2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 289.6 (West 2001); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1259 (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-411(a) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
944.35(3)(b)(3) (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c)(3) (1999); § 11-9.2(e) ILL. COMP. STAT. (2000);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-1-5(c) (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3520(a) (2001); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 21A (West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 344(1)(m) (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-
104 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.01 (1999); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 632-A: (2), (3) (1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(e) (McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-27.7 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1150: (A)(2) (Law Co-op. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-412(7)(b) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.160(2), 9A.44.170(2) (West 2000); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2003).
84. See 50 STATE SURVEY 2004, supra note 64.
85. See, e.g., Anthea Dinos, Note, Custodial Sexual Abuse: Enforcing Long-Awaited Policies
Designed to Protect Female Prisoners, 45 N.Y.L. Sch. L.R. 281, 284-85 (2000-2001) (citing several
decisive factors that keep female inmates from reporting sexual abuse: the inmates' own lack of
credibility, the specter of "protective segregation" from the rest of the prison population, fear of the
accused's retaliation and the unlikelihood of a favorable outcome in litigation). See generally AMNESTY
INT'L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT
WOMEN 15 (2001).
86. See GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 3, at 8 (finding that despite increasing
legislation, inmates in the jurisdictions studied made at least 506 allegations of staff-on-inmate sexual
misconduct between 1995 and 1998, of which only eighteen percent resulted in administrative
sanctions). Many cases involving prisoners do not fit the construct of a "typical" rape complaint because
the sexual interactions appear to be "consensual" and outside the scope of many state sexual assault
statutes, particularly where no physical force was used and the sex occurred as an exchange for highly
valued items such as food, better work assignments, telephone access, clothing, or drugs.
87. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NAT'L INST. OF CORR., SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN
PRISONS: LAW, AGENCY RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION (Nov. 1999) [Hereinafter LAW, AGENCY
RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION].
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activity" among state departments of corrections on the issue of staff/inmate
sexual misconduct, spurred by "recent legislative action, litigation, and ongoing
concern for improving agency policy and practice." 88 Second, the report found
that of the fifty-three jurisdictions responding to the NIC survey,89 twenty-four
had been involved in litigation in the preceding five years related to sexual
misconduct allegations involving staff and inmates.90 At the time of the report,
nineteen of the reporting states were in the midst of litigation.9' Third, the
report found that many state corrections agencies had no internal policies
specifically prohibiting sexual contact between staff and inmates.92 When
policies were in place, they were often vague and confusing. 93 The report also
found that while states reported training staff specifically on sexual misconduct
with inmates, the majority only provided one to four hours of training that
focused on successfully avoiding encounters and refraining from activity that
might lead to prohibited sexual or sexualized contact with inmates.94 Only eight
states specifically provided training to inmates.95 Finally, the survey revealed
varying levels of inter-agency cooperation in addressing staff/inmate sexual
misconduct. Some state departments of corrections (DOCs) may call on other
agencies for help in investigating allegations of staff sexual misconduct with
inmates, and some may not. Furthermore, only some DOCs had established
relationships with either state police or prosecutors to assure that cases were
vigorously investigated and prosecuted.96
NIC updated its earlier study in May 2000 to determine the progress
corrections agencies had made since the 1996 report.97 The study found that
corrections agencies were continuing to address staff sexual misconduct with
inmates. In 2000, all but eight states had specific statutes, which prohibited
88. Id. at 10.
89. See id. at 4. Participating jurisdictions included forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, the





93. See LAW, AGENCY RESPONSE, AND PREVENTION supra note 86, at 4. One DOC policy
document provided, "Personnel shall not... become unduly familiar in any manner with inmates,
parolees, and probationers." Id. at 4. Another provided that "Social relationships are prohibited,
including but not limited to emotional or romantic attachments with inmates in an institution, or on
parole or probation." Id. at 5. Still another provided that "fa]ny act or conduct which establishes,
maintains, or promotes a member's relationship with an offender... which is outside the color of
employment for personal benefit or gain which compromises a member's professional role is
prohibited." Id. at 5.
94. See id. at 8 (incorrectly paginated in original as page 6).
95. See id. at 10 Those eight states were Arizona, District of Columbia, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia.
96. See id. at 6.
97. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NAT'L INST. OF CORR., SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN
PRISONS: LAW, REMEDIES, AND INCIDENCE (May 2000) [hereinafter LAW, REMEDIES, AND INCIDENCE].
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staff sexual misconduct with inmates. 98 The report found that 15 states either
had enacted or amended statutes prohibiting staff sexual misconduct with
inmates since 1996. 99 The May 2000 report found that slightly more states were
involved in litigation related to staff sexual misconduct. The 2000 report
indicated that in 1999, 22 state DOCs were involved in litigation based on
sexual misconduct with staff or inmates, whereas in 1996, 24 states indicated
involvement in similar litigation over the previous five years.' 0 0 As in 1996, the
majority of these cases were individual damage suits against the corrections
agencies and the state.'0 ' Since 1996, states had written and implemented
specific internal policies prohibiting staff sexual misconduct with inmates,
increased staff training, and increased communication with inmates about staff
sexual misconduct.t12
The General Accounting Office (GAO), at the request of Delegate Eleanor
Holmes Norton, initiated its own study of the incidence of sexual misconduct
by correctional staff in June 1999.103 The GAO report found that most
correctional jurisdictions generally recognize staff-on-inmate sexual
misconduct as a problem and that forty-one states had passed laws
criminalizing sexual misconduct in prisons.1t 4 It also noted that most
correctional systems had participated in training programs to develop policies
and implement procedures to address sexual misconduct. 0 5 The GAO found
that, while laws and policies could help reduce staff sexual misconduct, they
had not helped as much as expected. 106 The GAO found that staff-on-inmate
sexual misconduct still occurs and is underreported.10
7
Specifically, the GAO report noted that "[t]he systemic absence of such
data or reports makes it difficult for lawmakers, correctional system managers,
relevant federal and state officials, inmate advocacy groups, academicians, and
others to effectively address staff sexual misconduct issues."'0 8 GAO found
that the absence of such information impeded efforts in four key areas: (1)
monitoring the incidence of the sexual misconduct; (2) keeping track of
employees accused and found to be involved in staff sexual misconduct; (3)
monitoring the enforcement of state law and corrections policies and
98. See id. at 2. The states that had not enacted statutes prohibiting staff sexual misconduct with
inmates were Alabama, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. At
present, only three states - Oregon, Alabama, and Vermont - lack laws prohibiting sexual contact
between staff and inmates.
99. See id. at3.
100. See id. at 4.
101. Seeid. at4.
102. See id. at 5-7.
103. See generally GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 3.
104. See id. at 2.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 8, 13-15.
107. See id. at 1-2; see also Dinos, supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why
inmates are unlikely to report custodial sexual abuse).
108. GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 3, at 16.
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procedures; and (4) identifying corrective actions to address misconduct.'0 9 As
a result, the GAO recommended the development of systems and procedures
for monitoring, analyzing, and reporting allegations of staff sexual
misconduct.110
The GAO report examined correctional systems in four jurisdictions:
Texas, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), California, and the District of
Columbia. The report found that the full extent of sexual misconduct in prisons
is unknown because many female inmates may be reluctant or unwilling to
report staff sexual misconduct.' Importantly, the GAO found that the lack of
systemic data collection and analysis hampered efforts to discover the full
extent of staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct. 112 For example, from 1995 to
1998, the three largest jurisdictions studied (California, BOP and Texas)
reported five-hundred and six allegations of sexual misconduct. Of that
number, ninety-two (eighteen percent) were sustained. 1 3 Staff resignations or
terminations followed the majority of the sustained allegations.'" 4 Two of the
three largest jurisdictions studied (BOP and Texas) provided no data on the
types of allegations involved (i.e., sexual contact, inappropriate touching,
invasion of privacy, etc.), thus the full extent of staff sexual misconduct in
those jurisdictions remains unknown. 1 5 Data from the District of Columbia
indicated that eleven percent of allegations by female inmates were sustained
and resulted in disciplinary action against staff members." 6 District of
Columbia officials cited lack of evidence as the reason why more allegations
were not sustained.
The GAO Report's call for increased and better reporting is welcome, but
it does not address a more pernicious problem- the paucity of sustained
allegations. The lack of sustained allegations can be attributed to several factors
present in prison culture. First, there is an issue of inmate credibility.
Generally, if there is a dispute between an inmate and a staff member, the staff
member's version of events will be believed. This notion that inmates live to
lie and manipulate staff and the corrections system means that inmates'
complaints about sexual misconduct and other matters are at best ignored, and
at worst, generate punishment and retaliation.' 1 7 Second, recent research shows
109. See id. at 2.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 15.





117. See BUD ALLEN & DIANA BOSTA, GAMES CRIMINALS PLAY: How You CAN PROFIT BY
KNOWING THEM 7-10, 33-77 (1981) (discussing essential conflict between the "keeper" and the "kept"
and identifying inmate techniques for setting up professionals who deal with them); GARY CORNELIUS,
THE ART OF THE CON: AVOIDING OFFENDER MANIPULATION 13-18, 25-30, 43-69 (2001) (describing
sociopathic personalities in general and inmate personalities in particular, and arguing that inmates cope
with incarceration through a process of "prisonization," including the adoption of techniques to
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that the code of silence in prisons is extremely powerful.118 A study by the
National Institute of Ethics found that 46 percent of responding officers had
witnessed misconduct, but had concealed it. Eight percent of those responding
were "upper administrators."' 119 Finally, fearing that they will not be believed
and will be retaliated against by staff and other inmates, many inmates do not
report staff sexual misconduct or will only report it long after the event has
occurred. This reluctance and fear often means that crucial, corroborating
evidence is no longer available.
D. International Scrutiny of Staff Sexual Misconduct with Inmates
In addition to developments in case law and legislation, sexual abuse of
women in the custody of the United States has generated intense scrutiny by
human rights organizations, domestically and abroad. 2 ' In 1996, Human
Rights Watch released a report, All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in
U.S. State Prisons,122 analyzing the United States' response to the problem of
sexual abuse of female prisoners. The report examined prison systems in the
District of Columbia, California, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, and New York.
The report sharply criticized practices in each of these jurisdictions and
recommended changes in training, legislation, and policy. Due in large part to
visible litigation on the issue and the Human Rights Watch report, the Special
Rapporteur for Violence Against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, issued a
stinging report on the treatment of women in U.S. prisons, focusing most
particularly on sexual misconduct and cross-gender supervision.123
manipulate officers); BILL ELLIOT & VICKI VERDEYEN, GAME OVER! STRATEGIES FOR REDIRECTING
INMATE DECEPTION (2003).
118. See generally Baron v. Hickey, 242 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Mass. 2003) (correctional officer
complained that he was forced to resign because he broke the "code of silence" and reported
inappropriate conduct between staff and inmates); Neil E. Trautman, The Code of Silence... Now We
Know the Truth, SHERIFF 16-18 (Mar./Apr. 2001) (finding that the code of silence permeates law
enforcement agency culture and affects professionalism at every level).
119. GAO REPORT ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 3, at 16.
120. See Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229 (D. Conn. 2001) (plaintiff's reports not
investigated, and plaintiff subject to retaliation for making complaints); Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d
592, 593 (8th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff "did not report these incidents to prison officials because she doubted
that she would be believed and feared the resulting discipline"); Morris v. Eversley, 205 F. Supp. 2d
234, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (plaintiff initially did not report assault due to fears of retaliation); Corona v.
Lunn, 2002 WL 550963, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002) (inmate denied assault due to fears of
retaliation), aff'd 56 Fed. Appx. 20 (2d Cir. 2003).
121. Reports about the sexual abuse of men and women in prison have been a routine part of the
country reports for human rights organizations in the years prior to 1996. However, in 1996, human
rights organizations that had previously scrutinized the human rights practices of other countries
undertook a deliberate campaign to hold the United States to the same standards they applied to other
countries. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ABUSES IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 18 and
accompanying text; ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
122. See generally ALL TOO FAMILAR, supra note 5.
123. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 18.
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This report was followed by a report from Amnesty International, "Not
Part of My Sentence:" Violations of the Human Rights of Women in Custody,
which focused on a number of issues affecting women in custody - including
sexual abuse. The Amnesty report reached essentially the same conclusions as
the Human Rights Watch report and called for: (1) same-sex supervision of
female inmates; (2) more explicit policies and laws prohibiting sexual abuse of
inmates; (3) stronger mechanisms for investigating and prosecuting sexual
abuse of prisoners; (4) appropriate supportive services and redress for sexual
abuse; and (5) greater protection from retaliation for inmates who reported
sexual misconduct.' 24 The report explicitly addressed sexual abuse of female
inmates, tersely disparaging the United States' practice of permitting male staff
to guard female inmates as contrary to international human rights standards
enunciated in Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 125 The Amnesty International report cited a moving letter that
investigators received from the general population of women at Valley State
Prison in California as an example of female inmates' response to cross-gender
supervision:
There's no voice telling taxpayers that their money is being wasted,
that we are in need of adequate medical care, that we don't like being
pawed on by male correctional officers under the pretence of being pat
searched. No, we don't have a voice that will speak about how we are
treated by the male officers, as if we were their private harem to
sexually abuse and harass. Not to mention the emotional and verbal
abuses when being addressed as bitches, niggers, wet backs, or any
other of the racial or sexual slurs that the abusive officer's tiny mind
can conjure.
126
Despite the increased visibility of the issue, enactment of legislation, and
critique by both domestic and international organizations, policy and practice
remain disconnected. Few changes have been made to address sexual
misconduct in prison-it remains underreported and underprosecuted. 127 Even
124. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMENS' RIGHTS PROJECT, NOWHERE To HIDE:
RETALIATION AGAINST WOMEN IN MICHIGAN STATE PRISONS (1998).
125. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE:" VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY 38 (1999) (criticizing the U.S. for not following international standards
requiring same-sex supervision of female inmates). Article 10 provides that "[a]ll persons deprived of
their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person." Id. (citing the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights).
126. Id. at 40.
127. This is certainly not indicative of the prevalence of misconduct in prison, because female staff
may be more likely to be disciplined than their male counterparts. This increased likelihood of discipline
may be due to their lack of connections, their vulnerability in the institution, or even the perception that
such conduct is worse coming from women than from men. As Rasche points out, "[G]ender can be seen
to mediate the peculiar context of prison where female correctional employees are also in a position of
dominance over female offenders but are apparently at less risk of sexually assaulting them." Rasche,
supra note 5.
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more hidden are the instances of sexual misconduct involving male and female
staff and male inmates.1 28  Even when the complaints are eventually
substantiated, corrections decision-makers are less willing to hold female staff
liable for sexual misconduct with male inmates on the theory that male inmates
are more predatory and that female staff are the victims in those interactions.
Thus, while many experts agree that a single remedy-same-sex supervision-
would ameliorate a large percentage of staff sexual misconduct with inmates,
the practice remains mired in controversy about whether it is appropriate for
both men and women, and whether it violates the employment rights of male
and female staff.
II. COURT DECISION-MAKING ON CROSS-GENDER SUPERVISION
The issue of same sex supervision is not new. The first prisons in this
country held men and women together, 129 and women were supervised by male
guards. Not surprisingly, there were many accounts of children conceived
during their mother's imprisonment. 130 This abuse of women in custody led to
public outcry and criticism from religious groups, particularly the Quakers,1
3 1
and spurred the creation of all female facilities. Same sex supervision was the
norm until the early 1970s, when women sought entry into the corrections field
after years of being excluded or being allowed only to work in female
institutions. 132 In the 1970s, women began to assert their rights under Title VII
to work in male correctional facilities. 133 Then, beginning in the 1980s with the
128. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (2001) (finding that
complaints by male inmates are viewed less seriously).
129. See Sheryl Pimlott & Rosemary C. Sarri. The Forgotten Group: Women in Prisons and Jails,
in WOMEN AT THE MARGINS: NEGLECT, PUNISHMENT AND RESISTANCE (Josefina Figueira-McDonough
& Rosemary C. Sarri eds., 2002) (citing an incident of sexual and physical abuse of a female inmate by a
male inmate at the Auburn, New York State Prison in 1865, which led to the opening of a separate
women's facility, the Mount Pleasant Female Prison).
130. See NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN IN STATE PRISONS, 1800-1935 97-98
(1985). Rafter gives a first-person account of the especially poor situation of women prisoners in the
South. Detailing their living conditions, she emphasizes the constant supervision of female inmates by
male corrections officers. She also narrates an account of Molly Forsha, who was convicted of murder in
the mid-1 870s, and gave birth to twins while incarcerated-allegedly as a result of sexual activity with a
prison warden.
131. See Carole D. Spencer, Evangelism, Feminism and Social Reform: The Quaker Woman
Minister and the Holiness Revival, at http://www.messiah.edu/whwc/Articles/article6a.htm [hereinafter
Evangelism, Feminism and Social Reform] (remarking that a prominent Quaker woman, Rhoda Coffin,
championed for her trailblazing efforts on behalf of women prisoners, is credited with founding the first
state prison for women, the Women's Prison and Girls' Reformatory in Indianapolis, Indiana).
132. Prior to 1972, Virginia and Idaho were the only states to hire women to work in men's prisons.
Corrections work was considered a non-traditional field for women, and there was considerable
opposition to their presence by administrators, fellow staff, and inmates. See Rita J. Simon & Judith D.
Simon, Female Guards in Men's Prisons, in IT'S A CRIME: WOMEN AND JUSTICE 226-41 (Roslyn
Muraskin & Ted Alleman eds., 1993) (citing LYNN E. ZIMMER, WOMEN GUARDING MEN 50 (1986)).
See also CLARICE FEINMAN, WOMEN IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 172 (3d ed. 1994).
133. See infra notes 285-319 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a National Institute of
Corrections sponsored study and other studies that indicate actual employment practices in women's
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increase in female employees in male correctional facilities, states began to
receive challenges from male inmates complaining about the presence of
women staff in sensitive supervision area, such as showers, living quarters, and
search posts. 134  Male prisoners1 35  and male-dominated staff and
administrations136  contested women's employment in male correctional
facilities with the former citing privacy and other constitutional concerns,1
3 7
and the latter challenging women's fitness for these "high risk" positions. 3t
With one notable exception,139 courts settled those early claims in favor of
female employees.
facilities, see infra note 357 and accompanying text. See also Linda Zupan. et al., Men Guarding
Women: An Analysis of the Employment of Male Correction Officers in Prisons for Women (Mar. 1990)
(unpublished manuscript, presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
in Denver, Colorado).
134. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 1992) (arguing cross-gender
supervision is a violation of Fourth Amendment privacy rights); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1100
(8th Cir. 1990) (arguing that cross-gender clothed pat searches are unconstitutional); Madyun v.
Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 955 (7th Cir. 1983) (raising First Amendment argument as to constitutionality of
cross-gender search); Cumby v. Meachum, 684 F. 2d 712, 713 (10th Cir. 1982) (alleging that cross-
gender supervision where female staff can view male inmates showering, undressing, and using the
toilet is violation of privacy).
135. See, e.g., Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1221 (6th Cir. 1987) (alleging that cross-gender
supervision violated their privacy interests); Avery v. Perrin, 473 F. Supp. 90, 91 (D.N.H. 1979)
(alleging female staff's presence constituted a violation of privacy rights).
136. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) ("appellants [Department of Safety]
argue that a showing of disproportionate impact on women based on generalized national statistics
should not suffice to establish a prima facie case" of gender discrimination).
137. See, e.g., Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1990); Kent 821 F.2d at 1221
("[plaintiff] alleged that he finds this policy and practice humiliating and degrading and that it violates
several of his constitutional rights: ... his limited fourth amendment right to privacy"); Avery 473 F.
Supp. at 91.
138. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335 ("In a prison system where violence is the order of the
day,... there are few visible deterrents to inmate assaults on women custodians"); Hardin v.
Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1368 n.l0 (11 th Cir. 1982) (indicating that defendant did not believe that
"protecting" women from work in male correctional facility constituted discrimination); Gunther v.
Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 955 (N.D. Iowa 1979) ("Defendant has repeatedly
asserted that placing women in contact positions within the institution would.., put the guards, both
male and female, in increased danger"); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp.
769, 775 (S.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985) (reviewing the holding of the lower court,
and remarking that "[d]efendants had failed to demonstrate... that they had a factual basis for believing
that substantially all women would be unable to safely and efficiently perform the duties involved");
Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (asserting that the "primary
concern [associated with] keeping women out of housing units at [high security housing] institutions
was for their own safety, as opposed to the privacy rights of the inmates").
139. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336 ("We conclude that the District Court was in error in ruling
that being male is not a bona fide occupational qualification for the job of correctional counselor in a
'contact' position in an Alabama male maximum security penitentiary"). But see, e.g., Rucker v. City of
Kettering, 84 F. Supp. 2d 917 (S. D. Ohio 2000) (holding that gender was not a BFOQ to work in male
jail facility, but noting that the Ohio State Constitution required same sex supervision); Gunther, 462 F.
Supp. at 958 ("Defendants have patently failed to bear their burden of proving that a BFOQ was
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the [facility]"); Griffin, 654 F. Supp. at 703 ("[A]ny
contention by Defendants that they are entitled to the Title VII BFOQ exception on the basis of the
inmates' right to privacy argument is without merit"); Hardin, 691 F.2d at 1374 ("Failure of proof
concerning ... the assignment policy ... would be sufficient grounds for this court's decision to reverse
the district court's opinion holding that sex is a BFOQ for the position of Deputy Sheriff'); Harden, 520
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In the early 1990s, as a response to highly publicized cases of sexual
misconduct between male staff and female inmates, the issue of same-sex
supervision again emerged at the forefront of corrections policy. 140 These
cases 14' were framed in much the same way as they had been framed in the late
19th century, 142 when scandals involving female inmates created the impetus
for single-sex reformatories.
Contemporary challenges to cross-gender supervision have been raised in
four separate contexts, with male inmates initiating the large majority of those
challenges: (1) male prisoners challenging supervision by female staff;143 (2)
female prisoners challenging their supervision by male staff;' 44 (3) male staff
challenging their exclusion from positions in female correctional institutions; 145
and (4) female staff challenging policies that limit their placement in men's
institutions.
146
F. Supp. at 774 (determining that "the BFOQ [being a female in a female institution] ... for the female
quarters of the Rehabilitation Center constituted a violation of... the Ohio Civil Rights law").
140. See, e.g., Lucas, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1046; Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994);
Women Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995); Women Prisoners III, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir.
1996). These and other cases of sexual misconduct by prison staff and officials have been highlighted in
the press and their insights have been incorporated into prison policy. See generally BOP Strengthens
Sexual Abuse Policies, Training Following Settlement, CORRECTIONS PROF., Apr. 17, 1998 (addressing
White and the subsequent policy and training impositions); Steven A. Holmes, With More Women in
Prison, Sexual Abuse by Guards Becomes Greater Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996 at Al8
(discussing sexual abuse of female inmates especially in California, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New
York, and the District of Columbia).
141. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (challenging the constitutionality of
cross-gender clothed body searches of female inmates); Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229
(D. Conn. 2001) (challenging the constitutionality of cross-gender pat searches of female inmates in
sexual trauma unit); Carlin v. Manu, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1178 (D. Or. 1999) (concluding that female
inmates do not yet have a right to be free from the presence of male guards); Cain v. Rock, 67 F. Supp.
2d 544, 549 (D. Md. 1999) (alleging that corrections policy of cross-gender supervision leads to sexual
assault against women prisoners).
142. See Spencer, supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing conditions leading to creation
of separate women's incarceration facilities).
143. See, e.g., Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995); Timm, 917 F.2d at 1093; Grummett
v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981).
144. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980); Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523; Lee v.
Downs, 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1980).
145. See, e.g., Tharp v. Iowa Dep't of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 224-225 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
the plaintiffs were not harmed by the minimal restrictions of the staffing policy); Torres v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health and Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1524, 1532 (7th Cir. 1988) (deciding that the
rehabilitative needs of all female inmates created a situation where being female could be a bona fide
occupational requirement); Carl v. Angelone, 883 F. Supp. 1433, 1436 (D. Nev. 1995) (alleging that the
director of the Nevada Department of Prisons intentionally discriminated against both male and female
employees on the basis of gender when, absent a valid BFOQ, he instituted a plan removing all male
correctional officers from a female prison and replaced them with female correctional officers from
other facilities); Edwards v. Dep't of Corrections, 615 F. Supp. 804, 805-06 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (holding
that being female was not a BFOQ for a permanent position in a women's correctional facility).
146. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (alleging Title VII sex discrimination
when female applicant to a position in a men's facility was rejected); Reidt v. County of Trempealeua,
975 F.2d 1336, 1337 (7th Cir. 1992) (alleging Title VII sex discrimination, when female plaintiff was
denied a position as a half-time "jailer"/ half-time traffic officer because the position had traditionally
been filled by male employees); Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11 th Cir. 1982) (alleging
Title VII employment discrimination claim after female plaintiff was denied an interview for a position
as Deputy Sheriff I in the male section of a jail).
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Typically, inmates have raised challenges pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,147
which prohibits deprivation of a right secured by either the Constitution or
Laws of the United States by a person acting under color of state law. The
majority of these claims have been raised under the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments. 148 Both male and female inmates have argued that supervision or
searches by staff of the opposite gender violate important privacy rights
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 149 Inmates have also challenged cross-
gender supervision as a violation of their right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 50 The
courts have had difficulty determining the rights of prisoners in situations
involving cross-gender supervision. The outcome of these challenges has
147. This section provides in part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen or the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994 & Supp. 1996).
148. While rare, First Amendment challenges to cross-gender supervision have been raised by both
male and female inmates. See, e.g., Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting
that, while the court did not address the legal validity of plaintiffs assertion of a First Amendment
violation, plaintiff's brief did indicate that exposing his naked body to female staff was especially
onerous because of his Muslim religious beliefs); Jordan, 986 F.2d 1521 (declining to address a female
prisoner's assertion that male staff supervision violated her First Amendment rights); Madyun v.
Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1983) (arguing that a Muslim male inmate's First Amendment
rights were violated because his religious beliefs prohibited him from being unclothed in the presence of
a woman who is not his wife, and female correctional officers' supervision of him constituted a violation
of a central religious tenet); Canell v. Oregon Dep't of Corr., 840 F. Supp. 1378, 1379-80 (D. Or. 1993)
(alleging a violation of "constitutional" rights because of the manner in which visual body cavity
searches were conducted: his Muslim faith forbade him from appearing naked before others); Thompson
v. Stansberry, 2002 WL 1362453 (Tex. App. Jun. 21, 2002) (finding that cross-gender strip search did
not violate male inmate's First Amendment rights).
149. See, e.g., Carlin v. Manu, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1179 (D. Or. 1999) (discussing whether female
inmates have Fourth Amendment privacy right to not be observed by male corrections staff during strip
searches). Male inmates have also argued that situations where they are supervised by female staff, but
male staff do not supervise women inmates, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Timm, 917 F.2d at 1098 (alleging that the Nebraska State Penitentiary violated
male inmates' Equal Protection rights, because similarly-situated female inmates were afforded more
privacy protections). Specifically, the male plaintiffs asserted that female inmates benefited from such
"luxuries" as not having male corrections officers routinely assigned to monitor their showers and
perform pat searches on them. Id.
150. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The inmates have
established a violation of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from 'cruel and unusual
punishments.' The record more than adequately supports the district court's finding of psychological
harm, and the harm is sufficient to meet the constitutional minimum"); Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F.
Supp. 2d 226, 230-38 (D. Conn. 2001) (discussing Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment
violations as they relate to cross-gender searches); see also Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 622 (9th
Cir. 1997) (questioning whether a Fourth Amendment privacy right for prisoners to be free from cross-
gender body-cavity searches and supervision even exists, and concluding that a male prisoner may not
be awarded monetary damages as a result of alleged privacy rights violations when he was body-cavity
searched and supervised in the shower by female corrections officers); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144,
146 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996) (declining to find that male prisoners' Fourth
Amendment privacy rights were violated when they were observed during various activities by female
corrections officers, and noting that since prison violence is a real threat, constant surveillance is
necessary, and prisoners could not legitimately expect the same privacy rights they enjoyed when not
incarcerated).
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depended in large part on three factors: (1) the gender of the inmate; (2) the
gender of the staff person; and (3) the nature of the intrusion challenged.
A. Inmate Challenges to Cross-Gender Supervision under the Fourth
Amendment
Both male and female inmates have challenged cross-gender supervision as
a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 5 '
Inmates have raised these challenges under the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and the more general guarantee of
the right to privacy found variously under the Fourth, Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments.' 52 While all courts clearly state that inmates cannot expect the
same degree of privacy they enjoyed in free society,153 most have found that
prisoners retain some right to bodily privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
54
As in all Fourth Amendment cases, the court must answer the threshold
question of whether the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy that
151. See U.S. CONST., Amend. IV (stating "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). See also
Cookish v. Powell, 945 F. 2d 441 (1st Cir. 1991) (considering cross-gender supervision a violation of
the Fourth Amendment only); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990) (considering the severity
of intrusion on the right of privacy); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985) (appeal from
hearing on violations of First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments where the court heard
arguments only on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment issues); Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo, 123 F.
Supp. 2d 1099 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (considering the Fourth Amendment right to privacy and Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F.
Supp. 2d 855 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (considering the Fourth Amendment right to privacy and the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Ashann-Ra v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559 (W.D. Va. 2000) (raising a Fourth Amendment and a Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claim); Canell v. Oregon Dept. of Corrections, 840 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Or.
1993) (summary judgment motion on the inmates' right to be free from cross-gender searches under the
Fourth Amendment); Canell v. Armenifikis, 840 F. Supp. 783 (D. Or. 1993) (raising Fourth Amendment
privacy issue with regard to female staff observing male inmates); Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp.
201 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (balancing the privacy rights of inmates that the Fourth Amendment requires
against the state's interest in security).
152. Although most courts proceed under the Fourth Amendment, some courts have attempted to
identify where the right to privacy for prisoners exists in the Constitution. In Sterling v. Cupp, the
Oregon State Supreme Court relied on the Oregon State Constitution. 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981). The
court recognized that privacy, as it was understood in Griswold v. Connecticut, is one of the only ways
to address penal principles at the federal level. Id.; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
153. Generally, courts have found that all prisoners, regardless of gender, have no reasonable
expectation of privacy as to their cells or belongings due to the nature of prison itself. Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that inmates do not retain a legitimate privacy interest in their prison cells,
but leaving open the question of inmates' bodily privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment).
154. Over the years, the privacy rights of inmates have been diminished. For an in depth discussion
of the gradual chipping away of privacy rights, see Miller, Sex and Surveillance, supra note 19, at 311;
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979) (stating that even though inmates retain constitutional
rights, these rights are subject to limitation); Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) ("Lawful
imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a
,retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.' But though his rights may be
diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country").
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society is willing to recognize.' 55 Additionally, in the prison context, the court
must consider whether the prison has a legitimate penological reason for
limiting inmates' constitutional rights.1
56
The bulk of cross-gender jurisprudence involves male inmates' challenges
to female supervision. Generally, male inmates have argued that supervision or
intrusive searches by female staff violate important privacy rights protected by
the Fourth Amendment' 57 and the more general right to privacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment.158 Female inmates, on the other hand, have not only
argued that supervision by male staff violates their Fourth Amendment right to
privacy' 59 and their right to be free from unreasonable searches, 16° but also that
it exacerbates past traumatic experiences and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.16 The majority of male inmates'
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (acknowledging that it was reasonable for a
person to expect privacy while talking in a telephone booth, thereby finding the related search
unreasonable).
156. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87-91 (1987) (establishing a list of criteria to be used by the
courts when evaluating Fourth Amendment violations of prison inmates).
157. For Fourth Amendment claims made by male inmates, see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736 (5th
Cir. 2002); Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1991); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.
1990); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo, 124 F. Supp.
2d 1099 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F. Supp. 2d 855 (W.D. Mich. 2000);
Ashann-Ra v. Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559 (W.D. Va. 2000); Canell v. Oregon Dept. of Corr., 840 F.
Supp. 1378 (D. Or. 1993); Canell v. Armenifkis, 840 F. Supp. 783 (D. Or. 1993); Bowling v. Enomoto,
514 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
158. Even though some types of personal privacy are part of fundamental liberties guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment, for the most part, cross-gender supervision cases that expressly rely on a
"right of privacy" have used a Fourth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614
(9th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 852 (1997); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995) cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
159. See e.g., Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524-25 (arguing violations of the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments); Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1414 (9th Cir. 1992) (arguing that cross-gender
viewing of a parolee during the administration of a urine drug test violated her privacy rights); Forts v.
Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1213 (2d Cir. 1980) (alleging that the assignment of male guards to areas where
they viewed female inmates in various stages of undress violated female inmates privacy rights);
Colman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 230-38 (discussing Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment violations
as they relate to cross-gender searches); Carlin, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (discussing whether female
inmates have Fourth Amendment privacy right in not being observed by male corrections staff during
strip searches).
160. See, e.g., Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524 (discussing female inmates' claim that cross-gender pat
searches violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches); Colman, 142 F.
Supp. 2d at 230 (finding that a female inmate had a Fourth Amendment claim she was subject to cross-
gender pat searches).
161. In Jordan, male guards searched several female inmates, and one inmate had a particularly
traumatic reaction to a clothed body search, which included pushing inward and upward on the inmate's
crotch and flattening her breasts. The inmate had to be pried from the bars of her cell and vomited after
returning to her cell block. The incident was the basis of the claim against cross-gender searches, and the
holding relied on the fact that the inmates were known to be victims of sexual assault or abuse. Jordan,
986 F.2d at 1523-24. See also Colman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 234-35 (female inmates in Danbury,
Connecticut facility were housed in unit for sexual violence victims, and court held that subjecting them
to cross-gender pat searches was a violation of Fourth Amendment privacy and Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment). But see Carlin, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (distinguishing
Jordan because 1) Jordan plaintiffs were subject to sustained invasive searches of breasts, buttocks, and
genital areas by male guards; 2) the searches were random and suspicionless; and 3) the plaintiffs had
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claims have been resolved under the Fourth Amendment, while courts have
been reluctant to address the Fourth Amendment claims raised by female
inmates, preferring to resolve the claims under the Eighth Amendment.' 
62
In Bell v. Wolfish, 163 the preeminent prison search case, the court ruled that
any expectation of privacy that detainees retained while in jail is diminished
due to their presence in the facility. 164 Consequently, jail staff conducting
visual body cavity searches' 65 on detainees of the same gender did not violate
detainees' constitutional right against unreasonable searches. 166Bell outlines
four factors that courts must weigh when judging the reasonableness of a
search: (1) the scope of the intrusion; (2) the manner in which it was conducted;
(3) the justification for the intrusion; and (4) the place in which it was
conducted. 67 Ruling for the jail, the Court found that the intrusion occasioned
been previously sexually traumatized). Note, however, that in Jordan the court points out that what the
Carlin court calls "sustained" searches only happened one time. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523.
162. See infra discussion of Eighth Amendment constitutional claims of inmates due to cross-
gender supervision.
163. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The challenged search addressed by the Supreme Court in Bell was a
visual body cavity search sometimes called a "strip search." The record is silent as to the gender
composition of those conducting the searches. However, given the fact these were strip searches that
required prisoners to disrobe and show their genitals, it is fair to infer that the searches were conducted
by staff of the same as gender as the inmates they searched. Also, in Bell, male and female pre-trial
detainees challenged numerous conditions of confinement in a newly opened federal prison. See United
States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), cited in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
529 n.10. Although the Supreme Court ruled on the question of inmate privacy in strip searches, it is
interesting to note what the Court did not rule on. Citing their privacy interests, the inmates had alleged
that "a 'sex blind' policy of staff assignments improperly results in male staff on the women's unit, and
vice versa." 439 F. Supp. at 158. After touching upon the difficult problems involved in cross-gender
supervision, the district court concluded that it would not "order the segregation of correctional
personnel to match the sexes of the inmates." Id. at 160. It did, however, "forbid entry into rooms or
bathroom facilities by officers of the opposite sex" in the absence of notice or emergency. Id. This ruling
was left undisturbed by the appellate court. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978). It was thus
untouched by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish.
164. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 557 (stating that "given the realities of institutional confinement, any
reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee retained necessarily would be of administrative
scope").
165. In Bell, the Court describes the visual cavity search for both male and female inmates. "If the
inmate is a male. He must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The
vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates are also visually inspected. The inmate is not touched by
security personnel at any time during the visual search procedure." Id. at 558 n.39. Additionally, in his
dissent, Justice Marshall notes that:
In my view, the body cavity searches of MCC inmates represent one of the most grievous
offenses against personal dignity and common decency. After every contact visit with
someone from outside the facility, including defense attorneys, an inmate must remove
all of his or her clothing, bend over, spread the buttocks, and display the anal cavity for
inspection by a correctional officer. Women inmates must assume a suitable posture for
vaginal inspection while men must raise their genitals. And, as the Court neglects to note,
because of time pressures, this humiliating spectacle is frequently conducted in the
presence of other inmates. Id. at 576 (J. Marshall, dissenting).
166. See id. at 560 (explaining that the necessity for visual cavity searches in order to maintain
security outweighed the detainee's right to privacy).
167. See id. at 559 (identifying criteria, later known as the Bell factors, to be used when balancing
detainee's privacy rights with a facility's security interest).
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by the strip search was minimal compared to the jail's justification for the
search.168 Consequently, the court found that the search was reasonable.
169
In addition to the Bell factors, courts rely on four criteria established in
Turner v. Safley. 17  In Turner, a class of inmates challenged state prison
regulations, which restricted inmate to inmate correspondence between
different penal institutions, with exceptions for correspondence between
immediate family members and correspondence by inmates on "legal matters."
The challenged regulations also prohibited inmate marriage unless the prison
superintendent determined that there were "compelling reasons" for the
marriage. 17 Ultimately, the correspondence regulations were upheld, but the
marriage restrictions were declared unconstitutional.
72
In deciding the constitutionality of the prison regulations, the Court
enunciated a four-part analysis for determining the constitutionality of prison
regulations: 1) the existence of a valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, 2)
the existence of alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to
prison inmates, 3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional
right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison
resources generally, and 4) the absence of ready alternatives as the evidence of
the reasonableness of the regulation. 173  The courts have used Turner to
determine whether prison policies that expose male inmates in various states of
nudity to female corrections staff are legitimate and of penological necessity.
168. See id. at 558 (explaining the factual circumstances surrounding the visual cavity searches).
The prison proffered that it visually inspected inmates' bodily cavities to ensure that prisoners did not
bring illegal objects into the detention facility in their anal or vaginal orifices. Id. Yet, even Bell has
been limited based on the reasonableness-or lack thereof-of searches. For example, courts have found
that a policy where male inmates are subjected to strip searches violates the Fourth Amendment. See,
e.g., Farmer v. Perill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that strip searches of male inmates
cannot be conducted in an open area visible to other inmates and staff without regard for privacy without
a justification); Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a same sex strip
search of a motorist stopped for a traffic violation and later believed to be under the influence of
marijuana was not reasonable since the motorist had no opportunity to hide a personal stash of drugs).
But see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741-43 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that cross-gender strip searches
were not unreasonable searches for male inmates, even if the policy on cross-gender searches differed
for female inmates).
169. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 561 (explaining that the prison staff had a legitimate interest in
maintaining security and the searches were not performed with an intent to punish the detainees).
170. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (applying a four part reasonableness test to prison
regulations that infringed on inmates' rights to send mail amongst themselves-a First Amendment
right-and to marry without the prison superintendent's permission-a fundamental privacy right
argument).
171. Id. at 82. While "compelling" was not identified in the regulations, prison officials testified in
the lower court proceedings that "only a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child would be
considering a compelling reason." Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 89-90.
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The governmental interests that the courts in those cases have found persuasive
are prison safety and equal employment rights of female correctional staff.174
Reconciling Turner and Bell, courts have also relied on a number of
tangible and intangible indicators: the frequency and intensity of the female
correctional officer's supervision of male inmates, 175 the professionalism of
female correctional staff, 176 and the circumstances of the intrusion (e.g. routine
or emergency). 77 Given the court's deference to prison administrators, this has
meant that most male inmate Fourth Amendment challenges to cross-gender
supervision have failed. 178 Yet, as noted above, the courts are hesitant to totally
disregard inmates' claims to privacy-particularly for female inmates, and
174. For the most part, cases that use the Turner analysis rely on a female staff person's right to
equal employment and the security of the facility. See, e.g., Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441. 447 (1st
Cir. 1991) (discussing circumstances where in an emergency situation, it is rational for a female staff
member to conduct a visual strip search on a male inmate); Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 619 (9th
Cir. 1997) (discussing cases where security and equal employment were sufficient to meet the rational
relation test); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that surveillance of prisoners
is necessary, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 opens prison employment to female staff);
Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 746 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that prison security interests outweigh the
right to same gender staff observation); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093,1100 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[W]hen
balanced against the legitimate equal employment rights of male and female guards, and against the
internal security needs of the prison, [inmates' privacy rights] must give way to the use of pat searches
on a sex-neutral basis as performed at [the facility]"); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("We recognize as legitimate both the interest in providing equal employment opportunities
and the security interest in deploying available staff effectively"). See also Miller, Sex and Surveillance,
supra note 19, at 329 ("The general trend has shifted from mutual accommodation of privacy and
employment rights consistent with the interest-balancing approach in Bell, to only partially
accommodating prisoner privacy or overriding privacy claims entirely when the basis for the underlying
policy is internal security or equal opportunity employment"). However, some cases have held female
staff's equal employment and institutional security can be overcome for otherwise unreasonable
circumstances in cross-gender supervision situations. See Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 188 (7th
Cir. 1994) (finding that a male prisoner is entitled to accommodations, such as changing female officers'
shifts or constructing privacy barriers); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980)
("[T]he Court must find that the plaintiff's rights were violated by the assignment of female guards to
posts where they could view him while he was completely or entirely unclothed").
175. See, e.g., Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that strip
searches conducted when an inmate leaves or returns to the housing unit are not unreasonable);
Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing how frequency and regularity of
viewing are taken into account when holding that viewing inmates in their cells, showers and from "play
yards" is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Canell v. Oregon Dep't of Corrections, 840 F.
Supp. 1378, 1381 (D. Or. 1993) (stating that a single viewing of an inmate that is intentional and not
motivated by penological interests can be illegal, as well as repeated viewing where prison officials fail
to take steps to limit such viewing).
176. See, e.g., Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 1997) ("So long as there is
sufficient justification for a guard to view an unclothed male inmate, and the guard behaves in a
professional manner, the gender of the guard is irrelevant."); Grummett, 779 F.2d at 495 ("[Fjemale
guards have conducted themselves in a professional manner"). See also John D. Ingram, Prison Guards
and Inmates of Opposite Genders: Equal Employment Opportunity Versus Right of Privacy, 7 DuKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 3, 24 (2000) (discussing professionalism within the corrections profession).
177. See, e.g., Cookish, 945 F.2d at 447-48 (declining to do a Fourth Amendment analysis, yet
discussing whether a visual body cavity search conducted by a correctional officer of the opposite sex in
an emergency situation would be a violation of an inmate's Fourth Amendment rights).
178. See Id.; Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 1997), Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860
F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210 (2nd Cir. 1980), Grummett, 779 F.2d at
495; Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
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circumstances where inmates are nude and the staff may have a prolonged view
of prisoners' genitalia.
179
1. Cross-Gender Viewing- Infrequent and Irregular
Although the courts have ruled that cross-gender clothed pat searches of
male inmates do not generally violate the Fourth Amendment, 180 there is
considerable disagreement among the circuits about the constitutionality of
staff of the opposite gender viewing inmates in various states of undress' 81 and
prolonged viewing of genitalia.182 Both male and female inmates have
complained that staffs observing opposite sex inmates while nude or
undressing violates their Fourth Amendment rights. 1
83
In Grummett v. Rushen, the Ninth Circuit held that cross-gender
observation of male inmates by female correctional officers was reasonable.
184
In Grummett, female correctional officers observed male inmates during
various stages of undress while they showered, used the toilet, or were strip-
179. See, e.g., Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Conn. 2001) ("Ms. Colman does
retain some limited Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy."); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521,
1524 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Whether such right exists-whether the inmates possess privacy interests that
could be infringed by the cross-gender aspect of otherwise constitutional searches-is a difficult and
novel question, and one that cannot be dismissed lightly").
180. See, e.g., Rice v. King County, 243 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished disposition),
(finding that clothed pat downs by female staff of male inmates is generally permissible); Timm, 917
F.2d at 1100 (holding that cross-gender clothed pat searches are reasonable when considered in relation
to security purposes and equal employment considerations); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 955 (7th
Cir. 1983) (allowing clothed pat searches because they do not violate inmate's right to freedom of
religion when balanced with security and female officer's equal employment rights); Smith v. Fairman,
678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that limited frisk searches by female staff violate no
constitutional right).
181. See, e.g., Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that inmate did
make a cognizable claim that his privacy right was violated by a "certain amount of viewing" by female
guards and implying that an excessive amount of viewing would be a violation of the inmate's rights);
Canell v. Armenikis, 840 F. Supp. 783, 783 (D. Or. 1993) (holding that the gender of the correctional
officer is irrelevant if the viewing would be proper by a same sex staff member). But see Hudson v.
Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 891 (D. Md. 1980) (prohibiting female staff from work posts that would
require them to see men showering, or in the wards where male inmates might be undressed or attending
to personal bodily functions, except in emergencies).
182. See, e.g., Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that female
officers filled all prison positions, but did not do strip searches except in severe emergencies); Wilson v.
City of Kalamazoo, 127 F. Supp. 2d 855, (W.D. Mich. 2000) (stating that Fourth Amendment privacy
rights were violated where plaintiffs were "denied any and all means of shielding their private body
parts from the viewing of others... for at least six hours"); Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (specifying that prisoner's right to privacy includes right to be free from "unrestricted
observation of [inmate's] genitals and bodily functions").
183. See, e.g., Grummett, 779 F.2d at 492 (alleging that prison policies allowed female staff to
view male inmates while showering, undressing, being strip-searched and using the toilet); Forts v.
Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1213 (2d Cir. 1980) (alleging that constitutional right to privacy was violated
since male guards were able to view the female inmates while undressing and using the toilet).
184. See Grummett, 779 F.2d at 496 (considering the reasonableness of the searches under the Bell
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searched. 8 5 Male inmates argued that although these activities were reasonable
searches when performed by male staff, they became unreasonable when
female correctional officers observed them.'8 6 Relying on the "infrequent and
irregular" nature of the visual intrusions and the administrative burden of
rescheduling female employees so that contact would not occur, the Ninth
Circuit held that the cross-gender viewing was not so offensive as to be
considered unreasonable. 1 7 The deciding factor in Grummett appeared to be
the infrequency of the incidents and the perceived professionalism of the
female staff. '
8 8
When male staff observe female inmates undressing, courts have avoided
finding Fourth Amendment violations by resolving female inmate complaints
under the Eighth Amendment. However, the Second Circuit has held that such
viewing should be avoided if at all possible. 18 9 In Forts, a class of female
inmates asserted that their involuntary exposure to male guards during various
stages of undress violated their constitutional right of privacy. 90 The women
185. Id. at 492. In Grummett, the search involved female guards supervising male inmates while
disrobing, showering and using the toilet. Female guards were assigned to the gunrail and not the main
floor. Additionally, female guards were not allowed to conduct unclothed searches of male inmates.
However, female guards occasionally observed unclothed searches of male inmates in emergency
situations. Furthermore, female guards could conduct pat searches, which did include the groin area. Id.
But see Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (imposing an order that prison
administrators develop a plan to minimize female officers viewing male inmates nude while showering,
sleeping and using the toilet). In Bowling, male prisoners objected to the assignment of women staff that
allowed for unrestricted observation of their genitals and bodily functions. Id. at 202. The court noted
that they were following the recent trend among the courts in recognizing that prisoners limited right to
privacy includes the right to be free from "unrestricted observation of their genitals and bodily functions
by prison officials of the opposite sex under normal prison conditions." Id. at 204. See also Moore v.
Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the male inmate's Fourth Amendment claim
was not frivolous since it was necessary to balance the need for the search with the rights of the
prisoner). In Moore, a male inmate challenged whether a cross-gender strip search was unreasonable
since male correctional officers were around and available to perform the search. Id. at 235. Since male
officers were an available alternative and the strip search lacked a certain exigency, the court allowed
the claim to be litigated. Id.
186. Grummett, 779 F.2d at 495.
187. Id. at 496 (holding also that limited pat searches were reasonable and observation of body
cavity searches were reasonable in emergency situations, due to the limited intrusion on the male
inmates). The court believed that even when balancing the privacy rights of the male inmates, the
employment rights of the female correctional officers, and the realities of prison security maintenance,
the cross-gender supervision of the male inmates remained a reasonable search since the cross-gender
supervision was casual and irregular. Id.
188. The Grummet court notes that:
[Tihe pat down searches conducted by the female guards are not so offensive as to be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. These searches are done briefly and while the
inmates are fully clothed, and thus do not involve intimate contact with the inmates' bodies.
The record indicates that the searches are performed by the female guards in a professional
manner and with respect for the inmates.
Id. at 496.
The use of "professionalism" seems to be code for the female officer's display of a lack of sexual
interest in the male inmate. The cases discussed infra involving male staff seem to adopt the view that
when viewing female inmates in a similar state of undress, male staff are "unprofessional"-- again code
for displaying sexual interest. Women are positioned as being above desire, while men are slaves to it.
189. See Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. Id. at 1213 (noting that male guards would often view female inmates through the glass
window on their cell doors).
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claimed that male guards often viewed them unclothed when their doors
simultaneously opened each morning.' 9' They also alleged that male officers
saw them unclothed while they slept. 192 To resolve this issue, the district court
judge ordered officers to give a five-minute warning each morning before
entering the female living area. 193 The court also granted female inmates'
request for an injunction against male guards working night shifts. 194 On
appeal, the Second Circuit extended the five-minute privacy warning and
allowed female inmates to cover their cell windows for fifteen minutes while
undressing or going to the bathroom. 95 Additionally, the court reasoned that
female inmates were interested in protecting their private parts from the
viewing of male correctional officers during the evening hours while they
slept.' 96 The court held that the use of nightgowns could provide such
protection without precluding male staff from working evening shifts. The
court found the administrator's interest in ensuring the availability of equal
employment opportunities for men and women, and the available ameliorative
option-five minute warnings, the ability to cover cells for fifteen minutes, and
the use of nightgowns-provided appropriate justification for a cross-gender
supervision policy.' 97 Thus the court reasoned, under Bell and Turner, that
while the female inmates had privacy concerns, these concerns could be met
with the modifications,' and therefore, the prison's cross-gender supervision
policy could remain in place.
191. Id. at 1214 (explaining that each morning, female inmates were not warned that their cell
doors were opening, which left them vulnerable to inspection without clothing, going to the toilet, or
cleaning up an unexpected menstrual flow).
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 1213-14 (finding that a female inmate's constitutional right to privacy was violated
by male staff in the corridors during the nighttime hours).
195. See id. at 1216 (maintaining that the five minute privacy rule appeared to be a compromise
that met the approval of both female inmates and male prison guards ). But see Joanne Wasserman,
Prison Rapes "Routine, " N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 28, 2003 (detailing recent litigation filed in federal
court alleging a pattern of rape of female inmates in New York state prisons).
196. See Forts, 621 F.2d at 1217.
197. Id. The court was concerned with limiting the employment options of male and female prison
employees and took careful steps to assure that no individual rights would be sacrificed by the new
policy revisions. While the court did not rule out the option of banning cross-gender supervision at night
entirely, the Second Circuit held that under the circumstances and facts of this case, such a sacrifice of
rights was not necessary. The court also recognized that balancing the conflicting privacy interests of
inmates with employment rights of correctional officers is a challenge that the courts have not been able
to completely resolve. Id.
198. Prior to the litigation, New York had promulgated additional provisions to protect inmate
privacy, including prohibiting assignments that required correctional officers "to conduct strip frisks of
inmates of the opposite sex," prohibiting permanent assignment of staff to posts where they could
routinely view staff of the opposite sex showering, and requiring that at least one staff member of the
same sex as the inmate population be assigned to each housing unit. Id. at 1213 n.3.
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2. Cross-Gender Viewing - Frequent and Direct
When the situation involves more frequent and direct contact with
correctional officers-including the unimpeded view of genitalia-courts have
held that cross-gender supervision constitutes a violation of privacy rights. Two
recent cases illustrate this point. In Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo,t99 four male
detainees were kept overnight in only their underwear when they refused to
answer whether they were suicidal during an intake interview. Female officers
were present throughout their detention. In addressing the inmates' Fourth
Amendment claim, the court found that even if the state had infinged the
inmates' rights, the infringement would still be valid if it were "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. 20 0 Relying on the fact that the men
were detained in their undergarments, the court held that "society is not
prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation by a prisoner
that he might not be confined even for a short period of time clad only in his
underwear.",20' The court did not conduct a Turner analysis because it found no
Fourth Amendment violation.
On similar facts, in an opinion released only days later, the same court
reached a different conclusion in Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo.2 °2 The only
distinction between the plaintiffs in Johnson and the plaintiffs in Wilson was
that the Wilson male plaintiffs were detained while wearing no clothing at all.
The factual distinction is somewhat significant because the court uses identical
language to describe the tests that must be met to establish a Fourth
Amendment violation. Relying on Bell v. Wolfish,20 3 the court found that "the
City's alleged practice of removing all of a new detainee's clothing does
,,204impinge on his Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The court found that
Kalamazoo's justification for not allowing the men to wear their underwear
failed the "readily apparent and available alternative" prong of the Turner
test.20 5 In direct contrast to the Johnson result, the court wrote:
[T]he Court remains unpersuaded that society is not, as a matter of
law, prepared to recognize as legitimate an inmate's subjective
expectation that he may not be stripped of all clothing and covering,
199. Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1101(W.D. Mich. 2000).
200. Id. at 1103 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
201. Id. at ll04.
202. 127 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
203. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
204. Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
205. Id. ("[P]laintiffs were denied any and all means of shielding their private body parts from
viewing by others, at least by video surveillance, for at least six, and as many as 18 hours. Yet the City's
justification for this greater intrusion is no different than its justification for its removal only of the
plaintiffs' outer clothing in [Johnson]. Thus, comparison of the pleadings in these two sets of cases
demonstrates that ... the City had at least one readily apparent, and available, alternative means of
minimizing the risk of suicide and securing inmate safety that would have also, at least minimally,
observed plaintiffs' interests in bodily privacy and modesty").
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even for a short period of time, simply because he refuses to answer a
question as to whether he is suicidal.20 6
Johnson and Wilson read together bolster the notion that female staff
surveillance of male nudity for an extended period of time violates male
inmates' Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy.20 7 Moreover, the court
drew a clear distinction between the Johnson and Wilson incidents, recognizing
a modesty interest as well as a privacy interest in not being subjected to visual
cross-gender searches for an extended period of time while nude.
208
The courts have also recognized that prolonged and direct viewing of
female inmates by male staff is a violation of privacy. Two cases involving
209 210women, Lee v. Downs and Sepulveda v. Ramirez, are instructive. In Lee, a
female inmate was removed from her cell after being found in her
211undergarments with a noose around her neck made from her prison clothes.
Upon fimding her, prison staff took her to the prison's clinic, where doctors
ordered a nurse to remove Lee's undergarments. Lee offered to remove her
undergarments if the male guards left the area. However, Lee claimed that the
male guards restrained her while the female nurse removed her garments.
21 2
The Fourth Circuit found that Lee's privacy rights were violated since the male
guards were present while she was forced to disrobe completely. 213 This is just
one example of courts' willingness to find a violation when male guards
observe female inmates being strip-searched. Additionally, in Sepulveda v.
Ramirez, a female plaintiff was required to submit to drug testing as a condition
of parole. 214 In September 1988, Officer Ludwig, a male who was not Ms.
Sepulveda's regular parole officer, entered the restroom while she was
urinating. Ms. Sepulveda asked Officer Ludwig to leave, but he laughed,
mocking her request while remaining in the bathroom. In distinguishing
Sepulveda from Grummett, its earlier case sanctioning cross-gender viewing of
male inmates while nude, the Ninth Circuit found that the circumstances
differed, since this violation included a plain view of the parolee's genitals,
206. Id. at 862 (emphasis added).
207. Note that the plaintiffs in Johnson and Wilson were all pre-trial detainees. Some question
remains as to what role the level of security and the stage of custody an inmate is in play in relation to
the outcome of privacy determinations. However, the court did not choose to make a distinction between
convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees in its holdings in Johnson and Wilson, referring to "inmates'
rights" to a subjective expectation of privacy. See Johnson, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; Wilson, 127 F.
Supp. at 860.
208. See Johnson, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; Wilson, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (attempting to
effectively reconcile the Bell and Turner tests).
209. 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1980).
210. 467 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1992).
211. 641 F. 2d at 1118.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1120 (noting "it was wholly unnecessary for the male guards to remain in the room and
to restrain the plaintiff while her underclothing was forcefully removed").
214. Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 467 F.2d 1413, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992). Sepulveda was paroled from state
prison in July of 1988. Id.
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which was "neither obscured nor distant., 215 The court, in acknowledging an
individual's right to bodily privacy, held that the right to be free from cross-
gender viewing when submitting to a drug test was clearly established and
found Ludwig's presence in the bathroom to be an unreasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment.
216
In addition to Sepulveda, the U.S. District Court in Oregon found that
female inmates' privacy rights may have been violated by male guards who
directly but casually observed female inmates being strip-searched. In Carlin v.
Manu, female inmates brought a Fourth Amendment action against male guards
since the male guards observed the inmates being strip-searched while
processing papers in the room and walking in and out of the room.217 The male
guards were immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity
because the illegality or unconstitutionality of their conduct was not clearly
218established at the time of the incident in February of 1996. Nevertheless, the
court noted that the guards might have violated the inmates' privacy interests.
The court distinguished this case from other case law, namely Grummett and
215. See Sepulveda, 967 F.2d at 1416 (noting that the circumstances involved in Sepulveda were
more degrading than the circumstances in Grummett since the cross-gender viewing in Sepulveda was
both closer in distance and more direct). However, the actions in Grummett occurred during an extended
period of time, while Sepulveda was subject to such supervision on only one occasion. Compare
Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985), with Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir.
1992).
216. Sepulveda, 967 F.2d at 1416. While Sepulveda uses the analysis of Ninth Circuit cross-gender
cases and is helpful, it is also distinguishable. First, Sepulveda involved drug testing for which a separate
body of case law has evolved. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989) (holding that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special government needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, such as public safety, it is necessary to balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether individualized suspicion
is required); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
that where a drug test is not for law enforcement purposes, government must offer another legitimate
purpose that outweighs the individual's privacy interests); Hansen v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 920 F. Supp.
1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that it was not clearly established at the time of the challenged urination
drug testing that direct observation under the circumstances presented violated constitutional norms);
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Council 33 v. Thomburgh, 720 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(disallowing Bureau of Prisons' plan for mandatory, random testing of all employees where special need
or particularized focus not demonstrated).
Second, Ms. Sepulveda was a parolee and therefore entitled to greater constitutional
protection of her privacy rights than inmates. Sepulveda, 967 F.2d at 1416. See also United States v.
Crawford, 323 F.3d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 2003) (claiming that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, parolee's
expectation of privacy is not defeated by virtue of his parole status; however, parole status reduced the
expectation of privacy that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable); United States v. Scott, 678
F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that parolees, as prisoners serving out their terms of punishment under
conditions of partial relief, enjoy constitutional rights commensurate with that status).
217. 72 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180-81 (D. Or. 1999). In Carlin, the search included male guards
walking in and out of the room and doing paperwork while the female inmates were being strip-
searched. Although testimony "differs as to how many male guards and staff were present during the
searches, however, it is not disputed that male guards and staff were present in the area for at least some
portions of plaintiff's skin searches." Id. at 1181 at nI.
218. Id. at 1180 ("Because observation by male guards during strip searches of female inmates was
not clearly identified as unlawful conduct under existing law, I conclude that the defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity").
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Sepulveda, on the basis that the guards in Carlin were passing casually in and
219out of the room for purposes unrelated to the strip searches.
More recent Eighth Circuit cases involving female arrestees have
broadened the holding in Carlin and retained the possibility that cross-gender
viewing of female inmates by male guards can violate the Fourth
Amendment. 22 Thus, courts are willing to recognize that both genders have a
limited interest in not being viewed naked for long periods, or up close by
correctional staff of the opposite sex. Frequent and direct viewing is the only
area where courts appear to treat male and female inmates equally. This
outcome differs from the case law on infrequent or irregular cross-gender
viewing discussed supra, and from the judicial standards on cross-gender pat
searches discussed infra. In both of those situations, female inmates receive
greater protection of their bodily privacy rights than male inmates.
3. Cross-Gender Pat Searches
Male inmates' challenges to cross-gender pat searches have suffered the
same fate as their challenges to cross-gender viewing. Courts have been
amazingly consistent in finding that clothed pat searches of male inmates by
female staff do not violate the Fourth Amendment.221 Similar to cross-gender
viewing cases, these body searches become more problematic under the Fourth
Amendment as they get increasingly intrusive and involve the genital area. For
example, in Sterling v. Cupp, male inmates sought relief from clothed body
219. Id. at 1179 (comparing Jordan, Grummett, Somers, and Sepulveda to the circumstances
surrounding the search in Carlin). The court did note that the Ninth Circuit has "acknowledged that
taken together, Grummett, Michenfelder, and Sepulveda might be read to suggest that up close, frequent
and intentional viewings by guards of the opposite sex could violate a prisoner's privacy rights." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
220. See, e.g., Hill v. McKinney, 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a female arrestee's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was kept naked and exposed to the view of male
guards for a substantial period after the threat to safety and security posed by the inmate had passed);
Spencer v. Moreno, 2003 WL 1043318 (D. Neb. 2003) (unsuccessfully challenging male officer's
presence in the examining room during vaginal, anal, pelvic, and breast exams). While pretrial detainees
are entitled to a greater degree of constitutional protection than prisoners-see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979)-these cases signal the court's willingness to accord even sentenced inmates
protection from observation of the their naked bodies.
221. See Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 1983). In Madyun the court found a
search performed on a male inmate by a female guard constitutional. The guard described the search in
an affidavit in the following way:
The resident is asked to raise his arms. I then run my thumbs under his collar, take my hands
and rub the top of his arms, come back under his arms to his armpits and down the sides of
his waist. I run my finger around his waistband. I run my hand down the outside of his legs
and back up to mid thigh. I then reach around and pat his chest area and his back.
See also Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that female guards
did not violate male inmates' privacy rights when observing them showering, going to the toilet, and
disrobing). Additionally, the female guards were allowed to perform clothed pat searches on male
inmates, which included the area of the groin since the searches were brief, did not involve "intimate
contact with the inmate," and were performed "in a professional manner." Id. at 496.
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frisk searches that included the genital and anal areas when performed by
female guards.222 The court found that female staffs' examinations of these
areas violated inmates' privacy rights since genital and anal areas are
considered to be the "final bastion of privacy." 223 However, rather than
excluding female guards from all frisk searches of male inmates, the court
instead prohibited female guards from performing body cavity searches and
searching genital and anal areas of male inmates when performing clothed body
frisk searches. 24
Cross-gender pat searches involving female inmates have often skirted the
Fourth Amendment shoals that stranded male inmates. 225 In Jordan v.
Gardner,226  the court quickly dismissed the female inmate's Fourth
Amendment claim regarding a cross-gender pat search,227 finding instead that
the search violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that had it
conducted a Fourth Amendment analysis, it would have been uncertain how to
find that female inmates' Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the pat
search.228 Unwilling to find cross-gender searches of women per se
unconstitutional, the court stated, "we cannot assume from the fact that the
searches cause immense anguish that they therefore violate protected Fourth
,,229Amendment interests. Judge Reinhardt, concurring in the judgment, found
that the cross-gender searches of the female inmates violated the Fourth
230Amendment, as well as the Eighth Amendment. Stating that the searches
222. 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
223. Id. at 132.
224. Id. at 137. See cf Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 53 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that frisk
searches of female guards on male inmates which include "placing her hands on his neck, back, chest,
stomach, waist, buttocks, and the outside of his thighs and legs" did not violate male inmates' privacy
rights since the searches were limited and did not include the genital and anal areas). The court found
that the prison accommodated both female employees' interest in equal employment opportunities and
male inmates' interest in privacy rights by limiting the scope of the frisks. Id. at 55. But see Rice v. King
County, 243 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that female guard did not violate male inmate's privacy
rights by "shov[ing] her hand very hard into Mr. Rice's testicles" since she did not have reason to know
that Mr. Rice was a victim of sexual abuse as a child). The court also noted that Mr. Rice's allegations
of such conduct were not supported by evidence and were raised for the first time on appeal. Id.
225. See infra discussion of Eighth Amendment claims.
226. 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
227. In Jordan, the court describes the searches as such:
"[T]he male guard stands next to the female inmate and thoroughly runs his hands over her
clothed body starting with her neck and working down to her feet. According to the prison
training material, a guard is to use a flat hand and pushing motion across the inmate's crotch
area. The guard must push inward and upward when searching the crotch and upper thighs of
the inmate. All seams in the leg and the crotch area are to be squeezed and kneaded. Using
the back of the hand, the guard also is to search the breast area in a sweeping motion so that
the breast will be flattened." Id. at 1523 (internal citations omitted).
228. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1532 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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"are intimate and deeply invasive," Judge Reinhardt opined that inmates do not
surrender their constitutional rights when they enter prison doors.2 3'
Although the majority in Jordan dodged the female inmates' claim that
cross-gender pat searches violate the Fourth Amendment, a more recent court
denied the defendant Federal Bureau of Prisons' motion to dismiss in a similar
case, finding instead that the cross-gender searches in this instance may have
232 233been unreasonable. In Colman v. Vasquez, Rosanna Colman was enrolled
in the "Bridge Program," a program for survivors of sexual abuse, at a federal
prison. Despite her participation in the program and her well-known history of
past trauma, Colman was subjected to random pat searches by male
234correctional officers. Vasquez, a male correctional officer, searched Colman
often, and such searches often led to unwanted sexual advances and touching
by Vasquez. Colman reported Vasquez's conduct to a psychiatrist in the Bridge
Program, who informed Vasquez's supervisor, Lieutenant Meredith. Vasquez's
harassment of Colman continued for two years, culminating in a sexual assault
in March 1997. Colman reported Vasquez's assault to Lieutenant Meredith and
subsequently brought an action against prison officials for failure to investigate
the harassment allegations. In her suit, Colman also challenged the
231. See id. at 1534 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Specifically disagreeing with the majority's
contention that these searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment, Reinhardt proffered that female
inmates had a right to be "secure in their persons" and "free from unreasonable searches." Id. at 1534
n.7. He argued that the Fourth Amendment not only applied to the women's privacy interests, but also
protected their right to bodily integrity and personal dignity. Id. at 1534. Reinhardt also found the cross-
gender searches and policy were unreasonable because the offensive and intimidating nature of the
search resulted in a constitutional injury that that could not be justified by any legitimate penological
necessity under Turner. Id. at 1537. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (plurality opinion).
232. Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D. Conn. 2001).
233. 142 F. Supp. 2d 226.
234. The prison had been on notice since at least 1999 that female inmates believed that random
searches conducted by male correctional officers were extremely intrusive. See Holder v. Harding, No.
3-98-CV-656 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 1999) (denying a writ for habeas corpus). In Holder, two female
inmates claimed that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a cross-gender clothed body
search. The court's description ofIhe intrusiveness of the searches in question follows:
A clothed-body search is intrusive; it is a search of an inmate's entire person. Pursuant to the
Bureau of Prison's policy, at the beginning of the clothed body search, the officer orders an
inmate to turn around, extend her arms and spread her feet apart. During the pat search, the
officer first feels the inmate's collar, back and shoulders and arms. The officer then moves to
the side and then to the front of the inmate, passing his hands over the inmate's arms, torso,
chest, waist, lower abdomen, hips, buttocks, legs and crotch area. During a search of the lower
body, the correctional staff is to search each leg of the inmate separately, from the waist to the
feet, with the inmate's feet spread. Staff is directed to pay special attention to the inmate's
lower abdomen and crotch. The proper practice calls for the officer to use the back of his hand
when touching the inmate's breast and crotch area. However, the record reflects many different
methods used at FCI Danbury and evidence that the palm of the hand is often passed over the
nipples and contrary to proper practice. In a proper, clothed body search that would achieve its
purpose of uncovering contraband, the officer must use a 'squeeze' and 'feel' technique.
Id. at 5-6. See also Peddle v. Sawyer, 64 F. Supp. 2d 12, 19 (D. Conn. 1999) (finding that a female
inmate had raised a claim under the Violence Against Women Act since she was sexually assaulted on
numerous occasions during cross-gender searches).
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constitutionality of the cross-gender pat search policy as it applied to women in
the Bridge Program. The court specifically rejected the defendants' contention
that Colman's only constitutional protection was the Eighth Amendment.
235
Additionally, the court distinguished the impermissible searches of the female
inmates from searches found permissible for male inmates, noting that it is
socially recognized that women experience unwanted touching differently than
236men.
The court rejected the defendant's per se argument that cross-gender pat
237searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court refused to find at
the pretrial stage that cross-gender searches did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Distinguishing Colman from the male inmate jurisprudence
holding cross-gender pat searches to be constitutional, the court reasoned that
allowing such case law to control its decision would require the court to hold
that all pat searches are lawful.238 Instead, the court acknowledged that, in
keeping with Turner, it also must look at the specific facts and circumstances of
the inmate and the search, the general nature of the search, and the prison's
reasons for the specific policy being considered.239 Further distinguishing
Colman from previous jurisprudence concerning male inmates, the court noted
that the circumstances surrounding the search were unique since the searches
involved female inmates who were also residents of the sexual trauma unit.24°
The court held open the possibility that the plaintiff could litigate the question
Jordan left unanswered-whether cross-gender pat searches of inmates with a
history of sexual abuse are unconstitutional under the Fourth as well as the
241Eighth Amendment.
While courts have afforded male inmates only limited protections against
pat searches by female officers, they have extended broader protections to
female prisoners. This greater recognition of female inmates' privacy has been
grounded in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence rather than established Fourth
Amendment precedent. Thus, female inmates' privacy is, at least in the court's
reasoning, closely tied to their sexual vulnerability.
235. See id. at 231 (stating that "[a]s Ms. Colman does retain some limited Fourth Amendment
right to bodily privacy, the court rejects defendant's legal contention that the only source of
constitutional protections is the Eighth Amendment").
236. See id. at 232.
237. See id. at 232.
238. See Colman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 230 (distinguishing this case from Turner, Covino, Timm,
Grummett, and Madyun).
239. See id. at 232 (finding that the searches could violate the Fourth Amendment since the inmates
still maintain a certain amount of privacy while in prison).
240. See id. at 233.
241. See id. at 234 (noting that the search could have no "rational connection to a legitimate
penological objective"). The court also notes that if less intrusive and restrictive alternatives were
available then the defendants would be unable to claim qualified immunity. Id.
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B. Cross-Gender Supervision Challenges Under the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain."242 While the Constitution "does not command comfortable prisons, 243
"neither does it permit inhumane ones.",244 Conditions of confinement are
serious enough to establish an Eighth Amendment violation when they result in
the denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities., 245 Thus, an
Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim requires an objective
246
inquiry into the seriousness of the alleged deprivation. If the alleged
conditions are sufficiently serious, then the complaining party must also satisfy
247a second, subjective, inquiry. That is, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind-with "deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety.,
248
In cases addressing cross-gender supervision of male inmates by female
correctional officers, the courts conduct the traditional Eighth Amendment
objective seriousness and subjective state of mind inquiries. 249 Under the
objective seriousness prong of this dual analysis, events that occur once,250 or
events viewed as less serious, even though they occur repeatedly,25t remain
outside the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
242. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th
Cir. 1999).
243. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,349 (1981).
244. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681-82
(1978) (affirming imposition of remedial orders on state penal system to correct egregious Eighth
Amendment violations).
245. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Talley-Bey, 168 F.3d at 886; Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1086
(6th Cir. 1995).
246. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (analyzing whether the alleged action was "objectively, sufficiently serious" to be a
violation of the Eighth Amendment and whether the prison official involved had a "sufficiently culpable
state of mind").
250. See Comwell v. Dalhberg, 693 F.2d 912, 914 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that a strip search of a
male inmate in an outdoor courtyard with female staff present on a winter day did not violate the Fourth
and Eighth Amendments; failing to address directly the fact that the staff members involved were
women); Rice v. King County, 234 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2000) (decision printed in table only), 2000 WL
1716272 (finding that a search in which a female corrections officer allegedly shoved her hand into a
male inmate's testicles did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo, 124 F.
Supp. 2d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (holding pre-trial detainees under one-time suicide prevention
surveillance while clad only in their undergarments did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment
standard). But see Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (holding
pre-trial detainees under one-time suicide prevention surveillance with no clothing constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment).
251. See Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 852 (1997)
(holding that Eighth Amendment claim met neither the subjective nor objective tests where the inmate
alleged cruel and unusual punishment based on repeated visual body cavity searches during which
female officers "pointed at" him and "joked among themselves" at his expense, and where female staff
joked and pointed at Somers while he showered); Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir.
1982) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation in female correctional officer's comments to a male
inmate regarding the nudity of male inmates).
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Under the subjective state of mind prong of the inquiry, courts look to whether
the actor knew the act would harm the inmate, and to the willful nature of the
act.252
On the whole, courts have been less sympathetic to male inmates' Eighth
Amendment challenges to cross-gender supervision than to similar challenges
raised by women inmates. In most instances, courts find that male inmates'
claims challenging cross-gender supervision do not even meet the objective
seriousness prong of the Eighth Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit's jurisprudence exemplifies many of the problems
male inmates face when they raise privacy claims under the Eighth
Amendment. In Smith v. Fairman, for example, Mr. Smith argued on appeal
that having female corrections officers conduct frisk searches violated his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because
"such searches [were] totally unnecessary and [were] intended to degrade and
humiliate male inmates. 253 The Seventh Circuit, ruling for the prison, reasoned
that requiring male inmates to submit to limited, fully clothed pat searches by
female guards, where those searches do not invade the genital area, fell short of
the kind of deplorable treatment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
2 54
Like most courts, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that prisoners enjoy
limited protection under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
255and seizures, but has not outlined the parameters of inmates' limited
remaining privacy rights. Instead, it simply noted that "regardless of how one
views the Fourth Amendment in this context, it is the Eighth Amendment that
is more properly posed to protect inmates from unconstitutional strip
searches.,25 6 Thus, for example, in Johnson v. Phelan, the Seventh Circuit cast
the plaintiffs claim as little more than whining. 257 Mr. Johnson filed a § 1983
action seeking damages because female guards observed him while he was
naked in the Cook County Jail's showers and while he was using the toilet.
According to the court, "what Johnson wants to show is not that the defendants
adopted their policy to cause injury, but that they [deliberately] ignored his
sensibilities." 258 Examining "deliberate," the court found that Johnson's claim
failed to satisfy the requisite standard of criminal recklessness, of wanting to
injure an inmate or knowingly disregarding a substantial risk.259 For the
Johnson court, deliberate acts without foreknowledge of serious consequences,
did not establish "intent" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.260
252. Id.
253. Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 53 (7th Cir. 1982).
254. Id. at 54.
255. Peckham v. Wise. Dep't of Corr., 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1998).
256. Id.
257. 69 F.3d 144, 149 (7th Cir. 1995).
258. Id. at 149.
259. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
260. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 149.
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Furthermore, the court found that cross-gender monitoring of inmates,
regardless of their state of undress, served a function beyond the infliction of
pain. First, it "makes good use of the staff' to have all prison guards serve all
functions.261 Second, cross-gender monitoring of inmates, regardless of their
state of undress, comports well with Title VII and the Equal Protection clause
by reducing the need for prisons to make gender a bona fide occupational
qualification. While the decision in Johnson specifically addressed a male
inmate's challenge to visual monitoring by female staff, the language of the
decision was quite broad and implied that its reasoning could even apply to
cross-gender viewing of female inmates by male staff.
2 62
In his dissent, Judge Posner not only acknowledged a deep societal taboo
against nudity in the presence of people who are not one's intimates, but also
criticized his colleagues for confusing the central issues of the case and for
using a Title VII interest in advancing women's career opportunities as a
defense to cruel and unusual psychological punishments. 263 "My colleagues toy
with the idea that unless the intentions of the prison officials are in some sense
punitive, there can be no liability under the cruel and unusual punishments
clause, whatever the psychological impact of the prison's actions.... The
motives of prison officials and guards [to sort custodial tasks by gender] are in
fact irrelevant., 2 64 Thus, Posner argued that Title VII cannot be used in this
instance to justify inhumane treatment of male prisoners. 265 Three years later,
in Peckham v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections,266 the Seventh Circuit
vindicated Judge Posner by specifically limiting the Johnson holding and
clarifying that, contrary to Johnson, prisoners do retain some expectation of
267bodily privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, the Peckham
court agreed with Phelan's ruling that the Eighth Amendment "is more
properly posed to protect inmates from unconstitutional strip searches, notably
,,268when their aim is punishment, not legitimate institutional concerns.
Also restricting Eighth Amendment safeguards was Johnson v. City of
Kalamazoo,269 discussed infra. The court held that the pre-trial detention of
male arrestees, who were stripped to their undergarments and held in the
presence of female police officers for an extended period of time, did not
satisfy the objective seriousness prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. The
court indicated that being detained in one's underwear for brief, or relatively
brief, periods of time in the presence of members of the opposite sex did not
261. Id. at 147; see also Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
262. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 147.
263. See id. at 152, 154 (Posner, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 155.
265. Id.
266. 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1998).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 124 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
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constitute the kind of "denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities' needed to support an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement claim or any other federally recognized right.
270
Perhaps because men's cross-gender complaints rarely succeed on Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy grounds, courts also tend not to
find the requisite harm necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation-
regardless of whether the complaint involves actors of the same or opposite
271 272sexes. 7 For example, in LaRocco v. New York City Dept. of Corrections, a
same-sex supervision case, LaRocco alleged sexual abuse perpetrated by a
male prison guard. The complaint alleged that on three separate occasions after
contact visits, "'Officer Pitt' sexual[1]y harassed me, assaulted me by throwing
me up against the wall and ripping my jumpsuit halfway off of me, held his
body up against me calling me a bitch and threatening me, and threatened to
sexually assault me the next time if I ever told anyone. 273 In addition, the
officer allegedly forced LaRocco to lift his penis and spread his buttocks about
three times after each contact visit.274 The District Court dismissed LaRocco's
complaint, finding that the incidents alleged did not satisfy the objective
seriousness prong of the Eighth Amendment evaluation because the officer did
not actually touch LaRocco in an explicitly sexual manner.
275
LaRocco is troubling because the misconduct alleged was arguably more
egregious than cross-gender pat searches or cross-gender visual surveillance.
This finding of fact fails to acknowledge a whole range of psychological harms
that occur far short of actual unwanted touching by another. Here, the ruling
plots only explicitly sexual and unwanted touching by another on an Eighth
Amendment trajectory, and ignores the harm that comes from being forced to
touch oneself in a degraded and degrading manner as LaRocco was when he
was repeatedly forced to lift his penis and spread his buttocks. Moreover, this
case, when juxtaposed with similar facts alleged by female inmates, suggests an
unwillingness by courts to recognize how sexually charged encounters with
corrections staff can affect the psyche and emotions of male inmates. Given
courts' hostility to these claims, it is not surprising that male inmates have not
raised Eighth Amendment claims as often as female inmates. Even in those
cross-gender cases where male inmates raised Eighth Amendment claims, they
270. Id. at 1105.
271. See, e.g., Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that a clothed pat search is
best analyzed under Fourth Amendment, and does not rise to the level of "shocking, barbarous treatment
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment").
272. 2001 WL 1029044 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (discussing Eighth Amendment sexual abuse/harassment
claim).
273. Id. at * 1.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *5 ("LaRocco does not allege that [officer] Pitt fondled him or touched him in a sexual
manner. These incidents are not severe enough to be considered 'objectively, sufficiently serious.' While
'despicable,' if true, they do not 'involve a harm of federal constitutional proportions') (quoting Boddie
v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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did so by way of challenging some other practice-no doubt hedging their
276chances of success.
Conversely, female inmates have successfully argued that cross-gender pat
searches and viewing by male guards can rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation. As previously mentioned, in Jordan v. Gardner, the
Ninth Circuit upheld female inmates' allegation that non-emergency, cross-
gender, clothed body searches were a violation of Eighth Amendment.2 77 The
court reasoned that, due to psychological differences, "women experience
unwanted touching by men differently from men subject to comparable
touching by women., 278 Jordan distinguished Grummet v. Rushen2 79 on the
grounds that the psychological trauma suffered by the Jordan petitioners was
different from the momentary discomfort male inmates experience when
viewed in states of partial or total nudity by female corrections officers.
Qualified immunity has been raised with mixed success as a defense to
Eighth Amendment claims. For example, the district court in Carlin v. Manu,
280
discussed infra, carefully avoided an expansion of Jordan by granting
defendants qualified immunity on the grounds that prison officials "are not
required to anticipate subsequent legal developments, and cannot be fairly said
to know the law unless it is sufficiently unmistakable from authoritative
sources.
28 1
In Colman v. Vasquez,282 however, the Second Circuit declined to give
qualified immunity to prison administrators, finding that they should have
known searches by male staff of female inmates housed in a unit specifically
for women with prior histories of sexual abuse involved unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain. The searches involved squeezing and kneading of the
breast, groin, and thigh areas. Failure to take reasonable steps to abate
established the deliberate indifference needed to succeed under a § 1983
283claim. In direct contrast to Johnson v. Phelan, the Colman court rejected the
defendants' arguments regarding efficient use of staff in all job functions and
276. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Dalhberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 1992) (arguing an Eighth
Amendment violation for excessive force in which male inmate was strip-searched in the presence of
female staff in the outdoor courtyard, but not including it as part of cross-gender argument);
Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988) (alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment as
a result of the use of taser guns, but allegation was wholly unrelated to the cross-gender search
argument); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a fully-clothed frisk search does
not violate Eighth Amendment); Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982) (challenging
female correctional officer's verbal comments as Eighth Amendment claim rather than as a cross-gender
supervision claim).
277. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1993). But see Rice v. King County,
243 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2000).
278. Id. at 1526.
279. 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
280. 72F. Supp. 2dat 1177.
281. Id. at 1180 (citing Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 1997)).
282. 142 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2001).
283. See Colman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
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the potential for conflict with Title VII without some showing that the cross-
284gender supervision policy was reasonably connected to those concerns.
On balance, it appears that women inmates have navigated the shoals of the
Eighth Amendment more successfully than male inmates. Apparently, courts
are more willing to acknowledge actual deprivation along with deliberate
indifference. To the extent women inmates are able to establish Eighth
Amendment claims, however, they often become bogged down in issues of
qualified immunity, supervisory liability, and sufficient nexus.
C. Inmate Challenges to Cross-Gender Supervision and Title VII
Inmates' challenges to cross-gender supervision are sometimes entangled
with the employment rights that staff are guaranteed by Title VII. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) was enacted to eradicate employment
discrimination and compensate victims of discrimination. 28 Title VII makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate in hiring, firing, compensation, and
conditions of employment because of one's color, race, sex, national origin, or
religion. However, gender discrimination is permitted when "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
286
This exemption is known as the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
To maintain a BFOQ, the employer must establish by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) that there is a basis for its belief that all or substantially all
members of the excluded sex will be unable to perform job safely and
efficiently,28 7 (2) that the job qualifications which members of the excluded sex
are unable to perform relate to the essence or central purpose of operating the
288business at hand, and (3) that there is no reasonable alternative to excluding
289all members of one sex from the position for which the BFOQ is sought.
Accommodating inmate privacy rights raises direct conflicts with Title VII in
the prison context, because of the employment patterns and promotion
290structures in prisons.
284. See id. at 237.
285. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. No 88-352), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2003).
287. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
288. Torres v. Wisc. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 346 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D. Fl. 1992). For a good
discussion of Torres, see Bonnie Belson Edwards, Rehabilitation as the Essence of a BFOQ Defense, 31
B.C. L. REV. 213 (1990).
289. See, e.g., Sterling, 625 P.2d at 123; Percy v. Allen, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1021 (Me.
1982) (female guards allowed at male prison if job tasks separated to ensure some inmate privacy); In re
Long, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732 (Cal. App. 1976) (requiring separate job tasks for female guards observing
male wards at state youth facility); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980) (bestowing privacy
upon female inmates while using the toilet and engaging in activities that would risk the exposure of the
nude body to male guards).
290. See generally Mary Ann Farkas & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Female Corrections Officers and
Prisoner Privacy, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 995, 996 (1997) (identifying the tension between women
corrections officers' right to employment and promotions under Title VII, and prisoners' "limited
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Before examining Title VII in the prison setting, it is useful to examine its
deployment in another setting where employment rights conflict with privacy
rights or "customer preference." For example, several Title VII challenges have
been raised where a qualified male nurse is prevented from intimate contact
with female patients.291 In each case, the male nurse's employment rights gave
way to the female patient's privacy rights. 292 In non-prison settings, the
solution appears straightforward: privacy trumps employment rights.
293
The application of Title VII to prisons is more complex. Unlike hospital
patients, inmates have diminished privacy rights due to their imprisonment.
This diminished privacy must also be viewed against the backdrop of female
entry into the corrections field. Corrections, like police, fire departments, and
the military, was an institution that was most hostile to women's entry into the
workforce.294 Women were considered too weak, too emotional, and too
feminine for these hyper-male environments. Consequently, courts in the early
years of implementing Title VII had to be strong and unequivocal in their
support for women's entry into these institutions, particularly corrections. Thus,
inmate demands for greater privacy and more humane treatment collided with
courts' desires to remedy past and present discrimination by opening these
closed, hostile environments to women. Female staff are a far more
right[s] to same-sex searches"); John Dwight Ingram, Prison Guards and Inmates of Opposite Genders:
Equal Employment Opportunity Versus Right of Privacy, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 3, 4 (2000)
(noting the courts' inability to reconcile these two important issues when faced with specific types of
searches, including pat-down, strip, and body cavity varieties); Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her
Womanhood: Defining the Privacy Rights of Women Prisoners and the Employment Rights of Women
Guards, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 6 (1999) (arguing that corrections officers'
employment should be based on "equal qualifications," and that qualifications with a "normalizing
effect" should be taught to all corrections officers, because of their benefit to the prison culture).
291. See Elsa Shartsis, Privacy as Rationale for the Sex-Based BFOQ, 1985 Det. C.L. Rev. 865,
876-87 (1985) (discussing Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds and remanded, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); Fessel v. Masonic Home of Del., 447
F. Supp. 1346 (D.Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Backus v. Baptist Medical Center,
510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); EEOC v.
Mercy Health Center, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159 (W.D.Okla. 1982).
292. See Shartsis, supra note 291, at 876-77.
293. See U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 at fn. 4 (1991) ("We have never
addressed privacy based sex discrimination and should not do so here... Nothing in our discussion of
the essence of the business test, however suggests that sex could not constitute a BFOQ when privacy
interests are implicated...").
294. See generally Sonja A. Soehnel, Sex Discrimination in Law Enforcement and Corrections
Employment, 53 A. L. R. FED. 31 (1981). See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 395 F.
Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (concluding that the police department's physical agility test had an almost
total adverse impact on female applicants for positions as patrol officers, which established a prima facie
case of employment discrimination under Title VII. The government defendants' efforts at validating
this test were not sufficient to sustain its use.); Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253
(Me 1979) (deciding that the police department's reliance on physical strength had disproportionate
impact on women); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving a female
city fire department dispatcher's claim against employer for sexual harassment and assault); Bartley v.
U.S. Dept. of Army, 221 F. Supp. 2d 934 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (alleging continuing harassment of and
retaliation against eight female staff members, including rape, sodomy, unwelcome sexual advances and
touching, requests for sexual favors, sexual innuendo, harassing phone calls, threats of physical harm,
non-consensual sex, and duress).
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sympathetic population and equal employment of women a far more laudable
goal than protecting the privacy rights of male inmates, who are perceived as
violent, irredeemable, and unworthy of concern.295 In this climate, women's
ability to supervise male inmates has become the touchstone for equal
employment in prisons.
Courts have struggled to define the limits of inmate privacy in the post-
Title VII era of cross-gender supervision. These cases can be generally
characterized as: (a) those that treat gender as a BFOQ;296 (b) those that do not
treat gender as a BFOQ;297 and (c) those that acknowledge that gender could be
298a BFOQ, but find alternatives, such as limiting contact between the genders.
Not surprisingly, because courts treat male and female inmates' privacy claims
differently, they have reached seemingly inconsistent outcomes when
reconciling Title VII and cross-gender supervision claims raised by male and
female inmates.
The first and only Supreme Court case on the topic of cross-gender
supervision in prison, Dothard v. Rawlinson, upheld a prison's refusal to hire
women in contact positions in the Alabama Maximum Security Men's
Prison.299 The Court's decision was based not on prisoners' privacy, but on the
vulnerability of female corrections staff in a maximum-security prison with
300"jungle-like" conditions, that had previously been declared unconstitutional.
Subsequent courts have limited Dothard's holding that gender is a legitimate
295. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 151 ("There are different ways to look upon the inmates of
prisons and jails .... One was is to look upon them as member of a different species, indeed as a type of
vermin, devoid of human dignity and entitled to no respect; and then no issue regarding the degrading or
brutalizing treatment of prisoners would arise. In particular ... [t]he parading of naked male inmates in
front of male guards, or of naked female inmates in front of male guards, would be no more problematic
than "cross sex surveillance" in a kennel .... I do not myself consider the 1.5 million inmates of
American prisons in that light") (Posner, J., dissenting).
296. Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(holding that gender can be a BFOQ for guards in women's units); Rider v. Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982,
987 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 993 (1988) ("Implicit in the Commonwealth Court's
holding.., was a finding that female gender ... is a BFOQ [for supervising female inmates]"); Tharp v.
Iowa Dep't of Corr., 68 F.3d 223 (8th Cir. 1995) (refusing to assign males to female unit was BFOQ);
Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that gender is a BFOQ where inmates retain
privacy interest in not being viewed unclothed by person of opposite sex); Philadelphia v. Penn. Human
Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97 (1973) (holding that gender is a legitimate BFOQ at youth facility).
297. Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (finding that a
BFOQ was not established to prevent women from contact positions, although some privacy protections
for male inmates were allowed); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769
(S.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding no BFOQ based on male privacy); Carl v.
Angelone, 883 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Nev. 1995) (transferring of males out of female prison not BFOQ
absent showing of harm to women by male supervision); Everson v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 222 F. Supp.
2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that gender was not a BFOQ for guards at female prison where an
insufficient amount of study had been done to justify prison action).
298. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
299. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
300. Shartsis, supra note 291, at 891.
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BFOQ for supervising male inmates to situations where extreme and
unconstitutional prison conditions exist.30'
At the same time that the Supreme Court upheld the BFOQ in contact
positions in the Alabama Maximum Security Prison, it used Dothard to hold
unconstitutional, height, weight, and strength requirements for corrections
officers in Alabama. Thus, Dothard became the wedge that helped women to
gain entry into corrections, particularly in supervision in male prisons.3 2 In
opening corrections to women, courts have relied on the second prong of the
BFOQ test; the gendered job qualification must be centrally related to the
business.303 Protecting male inmates' privacy is not central to incarceration and
may indeed be antithetical. Therefore, male inmates' privacy interests generally
give way to women's employment rights.304 Courts either deny male inmates'
30530privacy altogether, or maintain only its vestiges.30 6
Title VII challenges to same sex supervision in women's prisons and youth
facilities have resulted in different outcomes. As discussed above, courts have
been quite willing to exclude male correctional officers from women's prisons
and to limit cross-gender supervision by both male and female staff at youth
facilities, no doubt because of their view of women and children as particularly
vulnerable. Female inmates, unlike males, "retain a privacy interest in not being
viewed unclothed by a person of the opposite sex.
30 7
Decisions recognizing gender as a BFOQ are also based on the second
prong of the BFOQ test. Where a prison administrator documents the
psychological harm experienced by women inmates when exposed to male
guards, courts will exclude males from supervisory positions in the facility.30 8
301. See, e.g., Reynolds v. New York State Dept. of Corr. Serv., 568 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D.C.N.Y.
1983) (Dothard limited to the facts of the 'peculiarly inhospitable' environment of the Alabama
penitentiaries characterized by 'rampant violence' and'a jungle atmosphere'); Csizmadia v. Fauver,
746 F. Supp. 483, 492 at n. 14 (D.N.J. 1990).
302. See supra note 301.
303. See, e.g., Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981),
aff'd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985); Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690, 703 (E.D.
Mich. 1982).
304. In Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, the court disposed of male inmate privacy noting
that "[any contention by Defendants that they are entitled to the Title VII BFOQ exception on the basis
of the inmates' right to privacy argument is without merit. Inmates do not possess any protected right
under the Constitution against being viewed while naked by correctional officers of the opposite sex."
305. Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 774 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(concluding that female plaintiff had right to work as Rehabilitation Specialist in all male corrections
institutions).
306. Percy v. Allen, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1021 (Me. 1982) (female guards allowed at
male prison if job tasks separated to ensure some inmate privacy); Timm v. Gunther, 917 F.2d 1093,
1103 (8th Cir.1990).
307. Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Everson v. Mich. Dept. of Corr.,
222 F. Supp. 2d 864, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2002) ("Female inmates retain the right to be protected against
unwarranted intrusion by male corrections officers").
308. See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1524, 1532 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (allowed gender as a BFOQ for
guards in women's units, using a totality of the circumstances test). See Everson, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 892
("What is important to the decisions in Torres and in Robino is that the prison officials, before making
the change, conducted extensive studies of the prison environment and came to reasoned conclusions
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This is because rehabilitation and safety for both staff and inmates are
recognized goals of incarceration, and psychological harm may diminish the
prospect of meeting those goals, in particular the goal of rehabilitation. °9
While some courts will permit generalized findings of a need for exclusion
of staff of one sex from employment, to justify a BFOQ, others require more.
310
In Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections, for example, the court took
it for granted that corrections officers' tasks in female prisons would be
different based on their gender.31 1 Nonetheless, it refused to grant the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) a BFOQ for positions in female housing
units because the MDOC failed to seek less restrictive means to limit contact
between male corrections officers and female inmates.312
Courts have also been inclined to protect youth from cross-gender
supervision. This logic mirrors the courts' analyses of claims involving female
inmates. For example, the court in Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission excluded women from supervising males at a youth
detention home.313 Here, gender was considered a BFOQ because supervisors
would have to gain the confidence of children in order to advise and treat them.
The court reasoned that, "[t]o expect a female or a male supervisor to gain the
confidence of troubled youths of the opposite sex in order to be able to alleviate
emotional and sexual problems is to expect the impossible." 314
Challenges to cross-gender supervision are often framed by courts as
pitting inmate privacy against employment rights. However, the problem is not
discrete, nor is its solution. A range of acceptable alternatives exist, and it is
apparent that some states have found ways to accommodate staff employment
rights while providing a modicum of dignity, privacy, and protection for
inmates. States have created shifts with same gender staff315 at times when
that for particular penalogical reasons the female BFOQ was appropriate"). But see Carl v. Angelone,
883 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Nev. 1995) (transferring males out of female prison is not a BFOQ absent
showing of harm to women by male supervision).
309. See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1524, 1532.
310. See Everson, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
311. Id. at 893-94 (observing that "there are limitations on the scope of the tasks male corrections
officers can perform," and noting problems "associated with abuses in female prisons occasioned by lax
control of male corrections officers and particularly poor correctional practice such as pat-down
searches by them").
312. Id. at 895 (covering vacancies with females, increasing female coverage where necessary with
overtime, redeployment of female officers in supervisory positions).
313. 300 A.2d 97 (Pa. Cmwealth. 1973). But see Equal Employment Opportunity Commisssion,
1982 WL 21177, *4+, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1845 (E.E.O.C. Jan 19, 1982) (No. 82-4)
(allowing female supervisor at group home for male youths where shifts and search policy were adjusted
to accord privacy to youths).
314. Philadelphia v. Penn. Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 103 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973).
315. See, e.g., Tharp v. Iowa Dep't. of Corr., 68 F. 3d 223 (8th Cir. 1995). Two male correctional
officers challenged a policy that required female-only staff on certain preferred shifts. The plaintiffs
would have been eligible for the positions otherwise, given their seniority. They filed suit, seeking
damages for discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act.
The court concluded that same-sex assignments "constituted minimal restriction on [male] plaintiff's
employment," given their access to opportunities across the system. Id. at 226.
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inmates are showering or dressing. They have required prisons to provide
appropriate clothing, or privacy protections like screens. They have required
that opposite gender staff announce their presence when entering a housing
unit. States have also teamed male and female staff so they perform intrusive
activities on inmates of the same gender. These are all measures that have been
taken in women's prisons, and only in limited part in male prisons. The success
of such programs in women's institutions suggests that they should be
implemented in men's institutions.
In short, courts have privileged the privacy needs of women and children
over those of men. By treating women and children as vulnerable and worthy of
rehabilitation, while rejecting these notions for men, the courts reinforce the
very stereotypes and inequities that Title VII was designed to eliminate. The
vast majority of inmates are eventually released from prison, and all are worthy
of rehabilitation, regardless of age or gender. The limited BFOQ applied to
female or youth prisons can and should therefore be extended to all inmates.
D. Equal Protection and Male and Female Inmate Privacy Protections
Courts' application of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause to cross-gender supervision challenges raised by male and female
inmates is equally tortured and internally inconsistent. To date, there has been
an invariably disappointing result for male inmates-no protection of their basic
privacy interest.
Under Equal Protection analysis, courts review the constitutionality of
government action under one of three standards: rational basis, heightened
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. Under rational basis analysis; the government must
pursue a legitimate government objective and there must be a rational
relationship between the classification and that objective. 316 Many government
classifications are held constitutional under this test because the government's
objective only needs to be plausible, not actual.
Classifications based on gender are usually reviewed under a heightened
scrutiny standard. 3 Using a heightened scrutiny analysis, government actions
must have an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to be sustained. Actions
deemed "exceedingly persuasive" are based on proven data rather than
stereotypes about traditional gender roles.318 Government action must also be
substantially related to important government interests. 319 Finally, strict
scrutiny analysis applies where the disputed government action affects
fundamental rights, such as the right to procreate and the right to family, or
316. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
317. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556 (1996).
318. Id.
319. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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when the government makes classifications based on race or national origin.320
Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that the challenged action uses
narrowly tailored means to achieve compelling government interests.321
If courts employed a heightened scrutiny standard to analyze male inmates'
claims that cross-gender supervision violates equal protection, it is likely they
would prevail.322 The government's justification for permitting cross-gender
supervision of male inmates is based on the rationale that men do not
experience trauma, threat, or embarrassment from routine viewing or touching
of their bodies by female staff in the same way women inmates would
experience that same conduct by male staff.32 3 In other words, the government
would be unlikely to meet its burden because the sole basis for female
prisoners' greater "privacy protection lies in stereotypes of women that are
,,324consistent with women's traditional sex roles. However, several courts have
explicitly rejected equal protection claims in analyzing the differential
treatment of male and female inmates with respect to cross-gender
supervision.325
In Colman v. Vasquez, the District Court distinguished the jurisprudence
cited by the Federal Bureau of Prisons in defense of its cross-gender pat search
policy for female inmates on the ground that all of the cases cited by the
326government involved male inmates. Citing a long line of cases recognizing
that female inmates' privacy rights are "qualitatively different than the same
rights asserted by male inmates vis-A-vis female prison guards," the court found
that the female inmates in general and specifically those in Colman (who were
participants in a sexual trauma recovery program) had greater privacy rights
than male inmates. 327 Similarly, in Oliver v. Scott,328 the 5th Circuit found no
Equal Protection violation in permitting women inmates to have partitions and
privacy screens for showering and dressing while not making similar
accommodations for male inmates. 329 The court also found no Equal Protection
violation in permitting cross-gender supervision of men, but not of women.330
The Oliver court went even further than the Colman court, finding that men's
320. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
321. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
322. See generally Jennifer Amett Lee, Note, Women Prisoners, Penological Interests, and Gender
Stereotyping: An Application of Equal Protection Norms to Females Inmates, 32 COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REv. 251 (2000); Donna L. Laddy, Can Women Prisoners Be Carpenters? A Proposed
Analysis for Equal Protection Claims of Gender Discrimination in Educational and Vocational
Programming at Women's Prisons, 5 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 1 (1995).
323. Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the Government's Hands Off Our Bodies: Mapping a Feminist
Legal Theory Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender Prison Searches [hereinafter Miller, Keeping the
Government's Hands OffOur Bodies], 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861,865 (2001).
324. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553 (1996).
325. See infra note 336 and accompanying text.
326. 142 F. Supp. 2d at 230.
327. Id. at 230 (distinguishing this case from Turner, Covino, Timm, Grummett, and Madyun).
328. 276 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2002).
329. Oliver, 276 F.3d at 746.
330. Id. (citing varying "security concerns" as justification for cross-gender supervision).
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larger population, their history of violence within and outside of the institution,
and the history of finding weapons doomed any Equal Protection challenge
they might raise. 33 'These outcomes are permissible because Equal Protection
analysis has been steadily eroded in the prison context. The crux of an Equal
Protection claim is that similarly situated individuals are being treated
differently. 332 In the prison context, this has meant that courts compare male
and female inmates to determine if they are "similarly situated" with regard to a
particular claim and then analyze whether the differential treatment can
withstand the appropriate level of scrutiny.
333
Because of courts' deeply entrenched notions of maleness and femaleness,
which is then grafted on to the profile of men and women in custody, male and
female inmates rarely are considered "similarly situated." For example, in
Timm v. Gunter, male inmates asserted an equal protection violation because
female inmates were afforded more privacy than males.334 The court found that
males were not similarly situated. Males required more security and thus less
privacy than females because: (1) there were more male than female inmates;
(2) males committed more severe crimes; and (3) male prisons are prone to
higher rates of violence. 335 Although these propositions are true, the analysis
tends toward circular logic because different population sizes are used to avoid
comparing the sexes. Thus in the United States prison context, because of their
differing populations and crime trajectories, male and female inmates will
almost never be similarly situated.336
The Timm court failed to analyze the disparate treatment meted out to male
and female inmates of the same security classification. The appropriate inquiry
would find that male and female inmates "are similarly situated ... because
both groups of inmates are confined.., as a result of criminal conviction....
[They] are similarly situated because the State of Nebraska and the Department
of Corrections view the purpose of incarceration to be the same for all inmates
331. Id. at 747.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
333. See, e.g., Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1997); Canterino v.
Wilson, 875 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1989); Women Prisoners III.
334. 917 F.2d 1093, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990).
335. See id; see also supra note 331 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., Timm at 1103 (rejecting equal protection claim for failing to require cross-sex
monitoring of women prisoners because treating the sexes differently was justified by different numbers
of inmates, the severity of crimes, and frequency of inmate violence). See also Klinger v. Nebraska
Dep't. of Corr., 107 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that female inmates in one Nebraska prison were
not similarly situated to male inmates in another Nebraska prison for purposes of receiving prison
programs and services); Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (holding Iowa male and
female inmates were not similarly situated for the purpose of equal protection analysis); Women
Prisoners III, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding in part that Title IX and equal protection principles
were inapplicable because male and female prisoners were not similarly situated); Jennifer Arnett Lee,
Note, Women Prisoners, Penological Interests, and Gender Stereotyping: An Application of Equal
Protection Norms to Female Inmates, 32 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. R. 251, 258 (2000) (discussing doctrinal
confusion arising from refusal to hear prisoner equal protection claims since Turner).
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regardless of gender." 337 Moreover, changing patterns of violence indicate that
gender-based assumptions about violence are mutable. Women are being
incarcerated at higher rates 338 and they are arrested for increasingly violent
offenses.
339
Post Turner v. Safley, courts have consistently refused to apply heightened
scrutiny to prison regulations that affect constitutional and fundamental rights.
The Turner court ruled that the appropriate judicial inquiry to determine
"whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights, [such as the right
to privacy], is [whether the regulation is] reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.,,340 For example, in Yates v. Stadler34 1 the court
acknowledged that if there are legitimate penological interests in treating male
and female prisoners differently, then they could not be similarly situated for
equal protection purposes. 34 2 As a result, courts routinely permit differential
treatment of men and women in prison. While this reading of the Equal
Protection clause has meant that men receive less protection than women from
harms associated with cross-gender supervision, it has also meant that in other
instances men receive greater access to prison programming and educational
and vocational opportunities. 3
III. DIGNITY AND SHAME - COURTS' CONTRASTING VIEWS OF THE CLAIMS
RAISED BY MALE AND FEMALE INMATES
Several important themes emerge from the cases addressing cross-gender
supervision of male and female inmates. First, courts fundamentally see women
337. See Klinger, 31 F.3d at 734 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
338. The rate of incarcerated female prisoners increased from 11 in 1980 to 32 in 1990, the year
Timm was decided. By 2000, the incarceration rate for women was 59. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at 495 (2002).
339. The number of women arrested for violent crime increased by 37 percent between 1990 and
1999. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 1999, 217 (2000). At the same time,
the number of males arrested for violent crimes during that period dropped by 15 percent. Id. These
statistics are also deeply gendered. For example, between 1990 and 1999, the number of women arrested
for crimes against family and children increased by 124 percent. Id. This may not reflect an increase in
such crime, only an increase in police officers' willingness to arrest women.
340. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2260 (U.S. Mo. 1987); see also Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 233 (1990) (standard of reasonableness applies to fundamental fights); Overton v. Bazzetta,
123 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2003) (because the regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological
interests, this suffices to sustain them regardless of whether respondents have a constitutional right of
association that has survived incarceration).
341. 217 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2000).
342. Id. (acknowledging that if there are legitimate penological interests for treating male and
female prisoners differently, then they cannot be similarly situated for equal protection purposes, but
declining to assume that the conditions of confinement male prisoners complained of were legitimately
imposed, and remanding for more fact-gathering).
343. While in Timm the failure to recognize men's privacy rights inured to the benefit of women,
the same jaundiced view of Equal Protection harmed Nebraska women in 1994. In Klinger v. Nebraska,
the 8th Circuit found that male and female inmates were not similarly situated and denied women
inmates' challenge to Nebraska's failure to provide equal vocational and educational programming for
both sexes. 31 F.3d at 339.
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and men, not just male and female inmates, as having different privacy
interests.344 This difference in privacy interests shapes courts' analyses and
decisions on the constitutional protections due to imprisoned men and women.
What men and women are due depends on their sex.
Using a language of victimization and sexual vulnerability, the courts have
decided that female inmates deserve more privacy than male inmates. As
discussed above, these different approaches have a ripple effect on privacy
claims raised by male and female inmates under the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as Title VII challenges raised by male and female staff.
Courts obviously do not credit the view that men can experience trauma,
threat, or embarrassment from the routine viewing and touching of their bodies
by female staff in the same way that women inmates would experience that
same conduct by male staff. What is not clear is whether this belief is based on
notions that men do not experience the vulnerability that most people
experience about nakedness solely because they are men,345 or on some notion
of the particular powerfulness or dangerousness of these men: that these men
who are powerful or dangerous enough to violate the law cannot experience
any shrinking from the mere exposure of their nudity or touching of their
bodies.346 It may be that courts believe that even in the prison context, where
female staff wear the superficial vestiges of power and control, they are still
less powerful than men, even imprisoned men.347 Furthermore, the court's
limited protection of male nudity could be designed to protect male inmates-
and their last vestige of male power and control348-or it could be an attempt to
protect female staff from the power and potency of male sexuality. 349 What is
clear is that courts are unwilling to acknowledge the dignity claims being raised
344. See supra notes 132, 135-136 and accompanying text.
345. But see York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (finding that "[w]e cannot conceive
of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure from
view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect
and personal dignity"); see also Iowa Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't., 261
N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1977) (holding that "[in general, prisoners possess sensibilities to the exposure of
the body and its functions approximating those of people in the free world").
346. See Johnson, 69 F.3d at 149 (dismissing plaintiff's argument that prison staff "ignored his
sensibilities").
347. See Miller, Sex and Surveillance, supra note 19, at 296, 308, 322-325 (criticizing the Supreme
Court's inconsistent guidance on surveillance and searches by opposite sex guards); see also Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified.- Discourses on Life and Law, in GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 490-95 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Angela P. Harris eds., 1998) (proposing an
alternative interpretation of gender difference-or sameness-by suggesting that equality between men
and women be analyzed in terms of how power is distributed between them).
348. See Miller, Sex and Surveillance, supra note 19.
349. Id.
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by male inmates in almost any context unless it relates to the privacy of their
genitals-prolonged viewing and touching.35°
While courts have struggled with what is due to male inmates under the
Fourth Amendment's right to privacy, there has been little analysis of
constitutional protections for women challenging cross-gender supervision.
Courts have skirted the Fourth Amendment when women have challenged
cross-gender supervision practices. Rather, the courts have chosen to frame
women's complaints as violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. The courts have reasoned that women
experience cross-gender supervision very differently than men. Acts permitted
when female staff supervise male inmates are not permitted when male staff
supervise female inmates. Viewing of female inmates by male staff for even
brief periods of nudity is not permitted, absent appropriate clothing, privacy
screens, and knock-and-announce policies. Cross-gender clothed pat searches
of women inmates by male staff can violate the Eighth Amendment. To date,
there has been no case outlining any circumstance, except dire emergency,
where male staff would be permitted to either conduct or visually observe a
strip or cavity search of female inmates.
While the courts have clearly put inmates into a box in terms of analyzing
their challenges to cross-gender supervision, that box may have been of
inmates' and their advocates' own making. There is a qualitative difference in
the kinds of claims men and women have made challenging cross-gender
supervision. Men have raised claims challenging cross-gender supervision as a
violation of their privacy and dignity. They have spoken of supervision by
women as humiliating and embarrassing, apparently finding it less acceptable
to be under the control of a woman rather than a man. On the other hand,
women inmates challenge cross-gender supervision as a practice that is
damaging and destructive, exacerbating existing and past trauma experienced
as children and adults. Is it that men do not have those experiences, or that in
our culture and the culture of prison it is less acceptable or safe for men to
express vulnerability?
Not surprisingly, advocates frame their appeals and tell their clients' stories
in ways that courts can recognize and hear.35' The appeals target a
predominantly male and male-identified population of judges. In the process,
350. See supra notes 151 & 180-181 and accompanying text (discussing cases, including Smith,
Hudson, Wilson and Bowling, where the court declined to grant male plaintiffs relief for brief viewings
and non-intrusive pat searches of their genitalia by female staff).
351. See Binny A. Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of a Narrative, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 1-2 (2000) (differentiating between narratives and stories, and remarking that
the several varieties of critical legal theory employ client stories to elicit sympathy and indignation at the
mistreatment of a marginalized group).
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court decisions directly and indirectly reaffirm constructions of harm that are
not likely to challenge dominant constructions of masculinity or femininity.352
I posit that male inmates have raised these claims as dignity claims because
that is the vernacular that is acceptable and available to men in the free world
and in prison. The large majority of prison staff is male. The model of
supervision, which depends on confinement and a high need for control, is
male. Men have been socialized to detach from vulnerability, while women
have been socialized to embrace and identify it. Thus, in the prison setting,
male inmates will not articulate vulnerability, which is essential to the success
of an Eighth Amendment claim. To do so could mean that they would become
more vulnerable to abuse and retaliation from staff and other male inmates.
Rape of male inmates is well documented in both popular culture 353 and in
354empirical studies. It is well documented that staff may use inmate rape as a
method of punishing and rewarding behavior in prison.355 By placing the harm
that male and female inmates experience into narrow constitutional boxes
where men can only articulate the harm to them under the rubric of dignity, and
women can only proceed from the rubric of vulnerability and shame, the courts
have denied agency to both men and women to name the harm and petition the
court for appropriate relief.
356
352. Interview with Meda Chesney Lind, Professor of Women's Studies at the University of
Hawaii, in Maui, Haw. (Sept. 10, 2002).
353. One popular HBO television show is "Oz" (HBO television broadcast, 1997-2003). In addition
to serial programs, there are several box office features centered on prison culture, notably THE
SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Castle Rock Entertainment, 1994) and THE GREEN MILE (Castle Rock
Entertainment, 1999). Both are based on short stories written by Stephen King. See
http://www.stephenking.com/past-moviesl.html.
354. See, e.g., Helen Eisenberg, Correctional Officers and Their Perceptions of Homosexuality,
Rape, and Prostitution in Male Prisons, 80 PRISON J. 415 (2000); Cindy Struckman-Johnson et al., A
Survey of Inmate and Staff Perspectives on Prison Sexual Assault, presented at Midwestem
Psychological Association Meeting, May 4, 1995, Chicago, Illinois; Robert W. Dumond, The Impact
and Recovery of Prisoner Rape, presented at National Conference: "Not Part of My Penalty: Ending
Prisoner Rape," Oct. 19, 2001, Washington, D.C.
355. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of male rape in U.S.
prisons, and the varied circumstances under which it may occur). In fact, Congress has responded to
prison rape by enacting the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, § 117 Stat. 972
(2003). This legislation authorizes $60 million for training and technical assistance and provides
enhanced sanctions for those convicted of prison rape. The speed of passage and bi-partisan support for
this legislation, when compared to the lack of support for the Custodial Sexual Abuse Act of 1998,
which sought to address staff sexual abuse against primarily women inmates, supports and reinforces
gendered notions of the acceptability of violence against women.
356. See generally LAW, supra note 7, at 187, 225. See also Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the
Government's Hands Off Our Bodies, at 871 ("When judges employ gendered stereotypes of men as
sexually aggressive, and therefore limit the assignment of male -guards within the housing units of
women's prisons, they are accepting as a given that male guards are unable to respect the human dignity
of women when observing them nude in the act oftoileting, showering, and undressing. In accepting this
duality of aggression and vulnerability, judges are not just rationalizing outcomes they can feel
comfortable with on the basis of presumed traits. They are actually constructing a reality within prisons.
They are ultimately writing rules around the fact that 'boys will be boys' rather than facilitating a culture
change within prisons that requires male guards to conduct themselves professionally").
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Similar assumptions regarding vulnerability and sexuality arise as a
consequence of race. Given the disproportionate number of non-white inmates
in the United States prison system,357 racial bias and stereotypes create an
overlay or transparency of sorts for the discourse of sexual, physical, and
emotional vulnerability in penal institutions. This discourse lies at the heart of
cross-gender supervision challenges. These racial transparencies color courts'
views of male and female inmates' claims of the harm occasioned by cross-
gender supervision. This is not surprising given the disproportionate
confinement of minorities-primarily Black and Latino in United States
prisons.
For example, in male prisons, studies report that sexual abuse and rape
occur at higher rates between individuals of different races.358 In a study of
Philadelphia jails, 56% of prison rapes involved black aggressors and white
victims, while no identifiable case found involving a white aggressor with a
black victim.359 The stereotype of men of color in institutional settings is one of
sexual predation, dangerousness, and manipulation. Certainly, these men could
not be raising credible claims related to the modesty and dignity interests that
are damaged by cross-gender supervision.
Similarly, Black and Hispanic women face racial stereotypes of
promiscuity, 36 ° untrustworthiness, 36 1 and toughness. 362 In fact, studies have
shown that when non-white females raise claims of sexual abuse, they are not
only less likely to be believed, but are also less likely to be successful in having
their perpetrators punished.363 These attitudes affect non-white female inmates'
357. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Criminal Offender Statistics, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm, last updated April 2003 (finding that the prison and jail
population is 44% Black, 19% Hispanic, and 34% White).
358. See John D. Cronan, Forecasting Sexual Abuse in Prison: The Prison Subculture of
Masculinity as a Backdrop for Deliberate Indifference, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127, 158-160
(2002) (explaining that race is the most polarizing force in prison populations and is the central
explanation for rape and sexual abuse in prisons).
359. Id. at 162 n.3.
360. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse,
Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REv. 869, 884-886 (1996)
(developing a theory that places black women in a position of assumed promiscuity as a means of
enforcing the white male's supremacy, and using white supremacy as a way of explaining why the black
female is viewed as promiscuous).
361. See Meri Triades, 8 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L. J. 35 (2002) (stating that there is a
historical connection between veracity and chastity that has caused the public to question the
truthfulness of black women).
362. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between
Subordinating Systems, 71 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 251, 266 (2002) (opining that race affects assumptions of
vulnerability and makes the non-white female victim less likely to appear vulnerable).
363. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments: The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467, 1468
(1992) (stating that juries often assume black women exaggerate the truth, and noting that assailants who
attack black women are less likely to receive jail time than those who assault white women).
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success in raising vulnerability claims, such as those related to harm caused by
cross-gender supervision and sexual abuse.
Hence, race operates in ways that are similar to gender with regard to
vulnerability assumptions. For men of color, the difficulty lies in overcoming
the stereotype of being sexual victimizers as opposed to victims; for women of
color the challenge is to overcome the stereotype of promiscuity and
untrustworthiness.
Both men and women have a right to expect some degree of privacy in
their bodies, regardless of their penal status. While that expectation of privacy
may be diminished in recognition of a prison's concern for safety and security,
the state is not free to totally eviscerate the right. Some intensely private
activities, such as bathing, dressing and disrobing, and using the toilet ought to
be afforded some privacy rights. There is no legitimate penological reason that
inmates should be observed by staff of the opposite gender during these
activities. While same gender supervision does not entirely resolve these
privacy concerns either, same gender supervision does begin to address many
of these privacy concerns.
365
There is some acknowledgement of this principle in both domestic and
international law. In a recent case, Rucker v. City of Kettering,366 a female staff
member challenged her exclusion from employment in a five-day city jail
facility. The court found that while gender was not a bona fide occupational
qualification for performing the tasks in the jail, Ohio law nonetheless
prevented Ms. Rucker from holding the position. The Ohio statute provided
that same-gender staff had to perform certain duties. Similar statutes exist in
other states and cover cross-gender supervision of both men and women.
367
While states may vigorously contest these cases in the courts, what they do
out of court as routine practice differs. 368 Male corrections officers express
deep discomfort with cross-gender searches of women:
364. See Devon Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 U.C.L.A L. REV. 1283, 1301 (2002) (explaining
the assumptions in the white community that unchaste black women cannot refuse the sexual advances
of black men).
365. See Miller, Sex and Surveillance, supra note 19, and accompanying text (critiquing the
gender-based classification as a starting point for the analysis of sexual misconduct in prison settings,
and describing as myopic the current cross-gender analysis' assumption that gender is an appropriate
way to measure whether certain behaviors are violative of prisoners' rights).
366. 84 F. Supp. 2d 917 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
367. See, e.g, Alaska Admin. Code tit. 22, § 05.010(b) § 05.067(c) ("a staff member of the same
sex shall conduct a search" of newly admitted jail inmates; "a prisoner is subject to a strip search, by a
staff member who, except under exigent circumstances, must be the same sex as the prisoner being
searched"); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 1360(e) ("cross-gender supervision shall distinguish between visual
supervision, pat-down searches, and more intrusive searches"); Md. Regs Code tit. 12, §
02.03.07(B)(12) ("staff members of one sex may not conduct body searches of persons of the opposite
sex").
368. See Cross-Gender Pat Search Practices: Findings From NIC Telephone Research, NIC
Prisons Division & Research Center (Jan. 1999) (detailing broad diversity in policies for pat-down
searches employed at men's and women's facilities among the fifty states); Mark Matus, September
2000 Survey of Housing Unit Staffing at Female Correctional, Survey Prepared Pursuant to the Request
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Q. And you start at the genital area; is that correct?
A. Right. You come down and you start with the crotch area here then
you work your way down.
Q. And in going up into the crotch and genital area, you need to touch
it to make sure there's no contraband there, correct?
A. Exactly.
Q. Did it make you feel uncomfortable because you were touching the
most private areas of a woman's body?
A. I think so, I think so; at least I did. I felt very uncomfortable.
Q. But some women, you - some women felt uncomfortable?
A. I think so. I think they did. I think they felt degraded. I think they
felt degraded to a certain point. I know I would. When we come into
the institution, they search us coming through the gate. We feel a little
degraded at that point.369
The explicit or unwritten policies of most states reflect that discomfort.370
Male corrections officers offer that, more often than not, they do not thoroughly
search women inmates and try not to observe women when they are undressed.
Likewise, female staff report feeling embarrassed and threatened by their
contact with male inmates. Yet, because they often receive little support from
male corrections staff in the environment, they may overcompensate in order to
hide their discomfort. 3 7 1 While the Standard Rules are not legally binding, they
have enormous persuasive authority due to their relevance and usefulness as
basic standards for humane treatment of individuals in custody. Consequently,
they may gaze longer, taunt and threaten, and conduct searches that are more
intrusive than they need to be in order to demonstrate their power and control
over imprisoned men in order to ally themselves with their male colleagues or
intimidate male inmates whom they fear.372
International law recognizes the inherent threat to the human rights and
dignity of inmates in cross-gender interactions by providing the "Standard
of the Honorable Avem Cohn, Judge of the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Re:
Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections (Oct. 3, 2000) [hereinafter September 2000 Survey] (apprising
the judge of the fact that only four states-Hawaii, Nevada, South Carolina and Georgia-responded
affirmatively when asked whether housing units at women's facilities were limited to female corrections
officers only). The study does note, however, that thirty-one states have at least some gender-specific
assignments in women's facilities, including urine analysis collection, doctor appointments, and
positions requiring strip searches and transportation runs. Id.
369. Deposition of Officer Kenneth Heard, in Nunn v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22970 (No. 96-CV-71416).
370. See September 2000 Survey, infra note 368 and accompanying text.
371. See Miller, Sex and Surveillance, supra note 19, at 296, 300-309 (examining hierarchies of
dominance and submission through words and conduct); see also MacKinnon at 490-95 (proposing an
alternative interpretation of gender difference-or sameness-by suggesting that equality between men
and women be analyzed in terms of how power is distributed between them).
372. See e.g., MELISSA S. HEBERT, Amazons and Butterflies, in CAMOUFLAGE ISN'T ONLY FOR
COMBAT: GENDER, SEXUALITY AND WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 26-54 (1998).
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Rules for the Minimum Treatment of Prisoners. 373 Both Article 1 of the
Declaration against Torture and Article 1 of the U.N. Convention against
Torture exclude from the definition of torture "'lawful sanctions to the extent
consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners"' 374 The U.S. is a signatory to the Torture Convention and bound by
the Standard Rules to the extent that they are referenced in the Convention. In
addition to the prohibition against torture or other ill-treatment [of prisoners],
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [provides] that
prisoners are to be 'treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity
of the human person."' 375 The Standard Rules, which are by their definition
minimal standards that the world's nations should be expected to meet
regardless of material resources, 376 directly address cross-gender supervision
and provide that men and women shall be supervised in sensitive settings like
showers, toilets, housing units, and transportation for medical visits by staff of
the same gender.377 The United States has received harsh international criticism
in recent years for its failure to follow the Standard Rules for the Minimum
Treatment of Prisoners. 378 Many human rights organizations believe cross-
gender supervision increases the vulnerability of inmates to sexual abuse by
staff.3 79 The fact that many nations, poor or rich, more developed or less
developed, more progressive or more conservative than the United States
follow the Standard Minimum Rules with regard to cross-gender supervision is
persuasive evidence that following these Rules is both possible and
preferable.380
373. E.S.C. Res. 663(c), U.N. ESCOR (1957), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcomp34.htm.
374. NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (2d. ed.
1999).
375. Id. The American Convention on Human Rights has the same language except that it omits
"humanity."
376. Id. at279-281.
377. See G.A. Res. 663(c), U.N. ESCOR. at paras. 53(1) - 53(3).
378. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
379. Id.
380. See also Lei de Execuqio Penal, Art. 77 § 2 (Brazil) (providing that female prisoners must be
supervised by women); C.C.R.A., § 49(3) (Can.) (requiring same gender searches), cited in LOUISE
ARBOUR, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN EVENTS AT THE PRISON FOR WOMEN IN KINGSTON
58 (1996), but see Weatherall v. Canada, (1990) 1 F.C. 85 (importance of allowing women in
corrections field outweighs male inmates' privacy interest). See also Minister of Justice, Decree on
Regulations of the Imprisonment, Art. 4 § 1 (Dec. 21, 1999) (Czech Republic) (searches shall be
performed by person of same sex as the inmate); see also Council of Europe, Recommendation of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, No. R (87) 3, at III § 62 (Feb.
12, 1987) ("appointment of staff in institutions or parts of institutions housing prisoners of the opposite
sex is to be encouraged"), available at http://cm.coe.int/ta/rec/1987/word/87r3.doc, and David
Ramsbotham, Women in Prison: A Thematic Review by the HM Chief Inspector (July 2000), available
at http://www.homeofficer.gov/uk/hmipris/wippref.htm (reporting that male staff in UK prisons are not
permitted to search female prisoners or observe them in residential situations); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, 5 (1998) (noting that Venezuelan law prohibits cross-gender
supervision); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: PRISON CONDITIONS IN
VENEZUELA, 5 (1997) (observing that searches of female visitors are conducted by female guards); But
see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CUBA'S REPRESSIVE MACHINERY n.40 (1999) (documenting Cuba's
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IV. CONCLUSION
How do we extricate ourselves from the bonds of culture, habit, history,
and socialization? How can we acknowledge the history of violence against
women, both inside and outside prisons, and at the same time recognize the
basic human need to strive for dignity, regardless of our physical or social
circumstances? How do we clearly see male and female inmates' experience
through the multiple transparencies of gender, race, and class? Finally how do
we enhance women's opportunities as workers without subjecting inmates to
further dehumanization and degradation as a result?
The answer to these questions is found most clearly in the language of
human rights. International human rights principles can provide an analytical
framework and supply concrete solutions to the problem of cross-gender
supervision. Conversely, as described above, domestic courts have narrowly
applied available Equal Protection, Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence to constrict the rights of both male and female inmates.
Moreover, the domestic trend of narrowing privacy rights in the prison context
while expanding them in the public sphere 381 is simply inconsistent,
particularly under a dignity based approach to the construction of rights. An
acknowledgment of the innate dignity of each person, regardless of gender
would assist in this project. These notions are at the root of international human
rights law382 and have been acknowledged, albeit in dissent, by courts that have
considered the issue of cross-gender supervision.
In Jordan v. Gardner, arguing that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
cross-gender searches of female inmates, Judge Reinhardt opined that "while
privacy is the primary interest underlying the Fourth Amendment, that
amendment also protects persons against infringements of bodily integrity, and
personal dignity (emphasis added). The court refers to these interests together
as 'dignitary interests.' 383 Likewise, arguing that male inmates privacy rights
should not automatically yield to the employment rights of female staff, Judge
Posner argued, "[w]e must not exaggerate the distance between 'us' the lawful
one, the respectable ones, and the prison and jail population; for such
exaggeration will make it too easy for us to deny that population the rudiments
of humane consideration.
' 394
problems with cross-gender supervision and attendant abuse). See also COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI, §§ 44-45, 52nd Sess. E/CN.4/1996/94 (1996)
(documenting Haiti's problems with cross-gender supervision).
381. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2742. But see
Gerber v. Hickman, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
382. See Art. 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) (providing "[a]ll human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights").
383. See Jordan v. Gardner, 966 F.2d 1521, 1534 at n.7 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
384. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d at 152.
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While our constitutional jurisprudence is impoverished and conflicted in
this respect, there is a rich body of law in international human rights
jurisprudence that could assist us. In particular, international human rights law
focuses on the dignity of each person.385 Such an approach would allow for
either same or different treatment based on need rather than the relatively
immutable characteristic of sex. Under this construct, women could receive
greater privacy because of need or because of a history of victimization and
men could receive privacy because of their basic humanity without resorting to
the constitutional contortions currently necessary. Thus, the Standard Rules for
the Minimum Treatment of Prisoners, which provides for supervision of
inmates by staff of the same gender, recognize the need of both men and
women to be protected from the viewing of their naked or unclothed bodies by
correctional staff of the opposite gender. These rules, based on human rights
principles, focus not on vulnerability but on the right to dignity.
Yet, a critique of adopting the approach of the Standard Rules for the
Minimum Treatment of Prisoners in this country is that our history is different
and that our existing laws narrow the scope and application of international law
in this context. The most obvious statutory impediment to same sex supervision
of inmates is Title VII. In the early days of women's entry into corrections, the
only way that women could move up the ladder was through work in maximum
security male facilities which were seen as the "proving ground" for
advancement to higher level positions. This reason sounds very similar to the
arguments made about the advancement of women in the military and the
stalled advancement of women because they had not served in combat
positions. In reality women in corrections, like women in the military, have the
necessary skills to advance without serving in all male facilities. The privacy
rights of inmates should not be abridged in order to accommodate
discriminatory employment practices in correctional settings.
At the same time, both male and female corrections staff should have the
right to work in any facility they choose and for which they are qualified. My
argument is not that they should be totally precluded, but that they should be
limited to positions that do not abridge the basic privacy rights of inmates. If
the basic premise is that each person, regardless of their penal status, is entitled
to a basic modicum of dignity including the ability to control the view of their
body and their performance of basic bodily functions, then the rights of inmates
as persons, albeit with more limited privacy rights, is reconcilable with the
employment rights of correctional staff. This is a modest concession and would
place same sex staff in housing units, in situations where searches occur, and
on medical visits and transportation of prisoners. That leaves a range of other
385. See generally, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (1976) (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976); U.N. Convention against Torture, G.A. Res. 39/46 (1984).
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jobs and positions in correctional institutions for both male and female staff and
provides flexibility for corrections administrators to meet these goals in
creative ways, including the pairing of male and female staff in sensitive areas,
enforcement of knock and announce policies, appropriate clothing, privacy
screens, and schedule changes that permit same gender supervision of sensitive
area on particular shifts.
I propose these solutions not because they are perfect, but because they are
the best and most humane solutions in an explicitly coercive and dehumanizing
environment.386
386. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975) (exploring the historical birth and rise of the penitentiary); DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC
(1971) (exploring the nature and creation of penitentiaries for criminals, asylums for the mentally ill,
almhouses for the poor, orphanages for homeless children and reformatories for delinquent youth post
1820 in the United States).
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APPENDIX A
A: They came up for rounds and Lieutenant Brinson stayed, but
Lieutenant Alexander left and Lieutenant Brinson and Officer Rivers
was talking. So then he came back there and got the key -
Q: Slow down a little bit. You say he came back and got the key, who
do you mean?
A: Lieutenant Brinson got the key and unlocked our gate where the
girls was housed at ....
Q: And what did he do when he came to the area where you were?
A: He locked Trina Brown and Angel down and left me out.
Q: And what happened next?
A: Then Angela Collins' tray came for breakfast and the detail gave
her her tray but then she refused it and Lieutenant Brinson said if she
don't want to eat, then she don't have to. Then he told - ordered
Officer Rivers to go call down to the kitchen.
Q: Did Officer Rivers do that?
A: Yeah.
Q: Did he leave the unit?
A: He left the post of the infirmary.
Q: And was the post of the infirmary where you were at, at that time?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened after Officer Rivers left the unit?
A: Lieutenant Brinson asked me to come here and I came to see what
he wanted. He was by the door, by the gate on the wall.
Q: And what happened next?
A: He started feeling me through my jumpsuit.
Q: Did he say anything prior to doing that?
A: No. [sic] He just started feeling me through my jumpsuit and -
Q: Excuse me. Go on.
A: And then he pulled his - he unzipping his pants. Then -
Q: Hold on. I'm going to slow this down a little bit. He was feeling
you through your jumpsuit. Could you describe for the court what you
were wearing at that time?
A: I was wearing a nice shirt that the infirmary gave me and a jumpsuit
that was tied around my waist.
Q: And you stated that he touched you in between your legs. Did he
touch you anywhere else?
2003]
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A: And on my breasts. He was just feeling on them. He was feeling on
my private area.
Q: Now, did he say anything as he touched you?
A: No.
Q: Were there any other staff around?
A: No.
Q: Were there any other inmates around?
A: No.
Q: Now, what happened after that?
A: Then he took his penis out of his pants.
Q: And what did he say?
A: And he told me that if I tell anybody watch what happens.
Trial Transcript at 1-76 to 1-78, Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877
F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (No. 93-2052(JLG)).
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